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ABSTRACT 
 
Accurate supervision of fuel and control rod integrity in a nuclear reactor core is very important for 
maintaining a safe and reliable operation of the reactor. Fuel rod failures can cause increased doses to 
personnel in the power plant, increased backend costs, limitations of the reactor operation and 
unplanned shut downs, which can lead to large economic losses. Control rod failures are normally not 
as severe as fuel rod failures, but can lower the reactor efficiency, cause operational restrictions and 
increase a need for control rod inspections during outage. Additional inspections can cause a 
prolonged outage, leading to economic losses. 
A project with the main objective to improve the detection of fuel and control rod failures in 
boiling water reactors (BWRs) by implementing continuous helium measurements in the off-gas 
system was initiated in 2007. The work was performed in collaboration between Chalmers University 
of Technology in Sweden, Forsmarks Kraftgrupp AB in Sweden and Kernkraftwerk Leibstadt (KKL) 
in Switzerland. During the project, helium detector systems have been installed in the reactor’s off-gas 
systems at both of the nuclear power plants (NPPs). The helium measuring system is a part of a 
combined on-line system which also includes nuclide specific measurements of gamma emitting noble 
gases. This combined system provides continuous information of both the fuel and control rod 
integrity.  
The work described in this thesis can be divided into two parts. One part includes evaluation of 
helium measurements for detection of control rod failures at KKL, which was the main purpose for the 
installation of the system at KKL in 2008. The helium measuring system at KKL has shown to be able 
to identify and follow control rod failures on-line. Since 2012 the helium measurement system is part 
of the process control and is included in the KKL core supervision system, which monitors the thermal 
operational parameter of the reactor core and all the relevant chemical parameters of the reactor water.  
The second part of the work was to investigate the ability of the helium measuring system to detect 
the small amount of helium that is expected to leak out in case of a fuel failure. This was also the main 
objective for the installation of the system at Forsmark 3 (F3) in 2010. Some helium releases from fuel 
failures at Forsmark 3 have been detected with the current system, however, further measurements 
might be needed to optimize the technique.  
Several factors, including operational parameters, which are influencing the helium measurements, 
have been identified and implemented in the developed equation for calculation of the helium 
background level in the off-gases. When being programmed in the core supervision system, such an 
automatic calculation of the helium background level, will give an immediate estimation of the 
released amount of helium if the helium concentration increase relative to the background level was 
detected.  
Keywords: fuel and control rod failures, helium release, helium measurements. 
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Chapter	1	
 INTRODUCTION	
Fuel failures always lead to some release of fission gas accumulated in the rod during the 
operation, particularly noble gases and helium. Fuel failures can also result in the release of 
fission products, as e.g. volatile iodine isotopes, tramp uranium, other fissile materials and 
long-lived alpha-emitting transuranium nuclides. Such events can lead to a contamination of 
the internal surfaces of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV), fuel and the turbine system. 
Consequences of such contamination can be operational restrictions, unplanned shut downs of 
the reactor, increased amounts of personnel radiation exposure during outages and increased 
amount of long-lived waste. Detection of fuel failures is normally performed by analyzing the 
off-gases since an increase of noble fission gases is a sign of a fuel failure. Off-line 
spectroscopy of grab samples of the off-gases and reactor water taken with a certain time 
intervals, e.g. once a week, is a standard procedure in BWRs. This procedure can, however, 
leave the failure undetected in the core for quite some time if the increase of the noble gases is 
not observed. Separation of additional primary fuel failures from the degradation of already 
existing failures can also be difficult when only analyzing grab samples since the mayor 
content of long-lived noble gases in a fuel rod is released within a short time period. When a 
failure and its location are detected, it is possible reduce or delay its degradation by adjusting 
the reactor operation [1-5]. Another possibility to monitor off-gas activity is by on-line 
measurements, where the system for nuclide specific measuring of gamma emitting noble gas 
has been proven to be an efficient system for the surveillance of fuel rod integrity and 
detection of fuel failures [1-5]. Such a system allows continuous surveillance of the fuel 
integrity and gives fast response during the operation. These possibilities are also very useful 
during the power suppression testing/flux tilting (PST) [1-5].  
Control rod failures in form of small cracks might not have as crucial consequences as fuel 
failures. However, it is essential to know the control rod integrity in the core to minimize 
tritium (3H) wash out and chemical transients in the reactor water. When an open crack 
develops in a control rod, boron carbide (B4C), lithium hydroxide (LiOH), etc. are washed 
out. The boron washout might decrease the efficiency of the reactor and wash out of LiOH 
might change the coolant properties, e.g. increase the conductivity and pH level. Control rod 
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failures are usually detected by measurements of tritium levels in the reactor water since the 
irradiation of control rods containing B4C leads to tritium production. If an open crack occurs, 
tritium can leak out and mix with the already existing tritium in the reactor water. Reactor 
water samples are usually taken once a week and will therefore not give an immediate 
indication of a control rod failure. Besides that, the interpretation of the measured data is 
sometimes difficult. Another method for detection of control rod failures is by monitoring the 
levels of boric acid in the reactor water. However, the concentration of the boron in the 
reactor water depends on the condition of the ion exchangers; therefore the measured results 
can sometimes be misleading. By optimizing the ion exchangers, the levels of the boron in the 
reactor water can be decreased although leaking control rods might still be present in the core.  
In addition to the tritium production, helium is also produced during the irradiation of 
control rods containing B4C. Therefore control rod failures can be detected by continuous 
monitoring of helium in the off-gas system. Helium measurements give also additional 
information about the presence of fuel rod failures, since fuel rods contain both helium and 
gamma emitting noble gases, while control rods only contain helium. 
This work is built on the content of Papers I-VII. The idea of using helium measurements 
for control rods failure detection has been expressed a number of years ago [6]. In addition, 
whether such a method could be useful for fuel rod failure detection has also been discussed 
at some nuclear power plants (NPP). This thesis covers a study of the ability of on-line helium 
measuring system to be useful for detection of fuel and control rod failures.  
Chapters 2 and 3 describe the fuel and control rod failure mechanisms and give an 
overview of different available methods for failure detection. Chapter 4 includes an 
explanation of the amounts and sources of helium in both fuel and control rods, which allows 
the implementation of a helium measuring system for fuel and control rod failure detection. In 
Chapter 5, a description of combined measuring system at both KKL and Forsmark is 
presented. It has been established that in order to be able to make a correct analysis of the 
measured data, there are number of factors that have to be taken into account. These factors 
are discussed in Chapter 6. Experiences from measurements to detect control rod failures at 
KKL are shown in Chapter 7, while experiences from fuel failure detection at Forsmark are 
presented in Chapter 8. Finally, Chapters 9 and 10, summarize the work and provide ideas for 
additional applications for the system, further improvements or modifications.   
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Chapter	2	
 FUEL	ROD	FAILURES	
This chapter includes an overview of fuel failures and discusses some available 
methods for detection of fuel failures that are implemented at NPPs, also described in 
Paper II. 
 
Continuous improvements and modifications of the fuel design have resulted in a significant 
reduction of fuel failures at NPPs. However, in case of a failure, accurate information of the 
failure is of high importance to be able to minimize the risk of its degradation and fuel 
washout.  
Fuel failures always lead to some release of noble fission gases which allows the detection 
of failures by analysing the off-gases of the reactor. However, sometimes the size of the 
failure is so small that the release of radioactive noble gases is below the detection limit 
which can lead to that the failure remains undetected until wash out of iodine or fissile 
material occurs. If release of volatile fission products (VFP) such as iodine isotopes, fissile 
material and long-lived alpha-emitting transuranium nuclides will occur in the core, the 
consequences of the failure will be more severe and it may result in increased personnel 
radiation exposure during outages, increased amount of long-lived waste and operational 
restrictions. Additionally, an increase in 58Co, 60Co, 97Zr activity, as well as an increase of 
active corrosion products, outside the core is often observed after severe fuel failures. This 
occurs due to tramp uranium fission and presumably due to knockout of these nuclides from 
the crud layer by fission recoils from the thin layer of tramp uranium, causing an indirect 
radiological consequence of fuel rod defects with loss of fissile material [1, 2]. Tramp 
uranium is free fissile material in the reactor core deposited on fuel rod surfaces or reactor 
pressure vessel surfaces. The origin of the tramp uranium in the core is fuel washed out from 
previous failures or due to uranium pollutions from newly fabricated and inserted fuel rods. 
Depending on the type and size of a failure and subsequent release rates, operational 
restrictions might apply. In case of degradation and risk for fuel washout, the power plant 
might need to perform an intermediate shut down in order to remove leaking fuel from the 
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core. Guidelines regarding operation with a fuel failure in core may differ from one power 
plant to another, based on own evaluation and recommendations from corresponding 
responsible authorities.  
Fuel failures are usually divided into primary and secondary failures. Failure of a fuel rod 
begins as a primary failure in a form of a small breach in the cladding caused by different 
mechanisms examples of which are given in Sec. 2.1.  
2.1 Primary	fuel	rod	failures	
A primary failure is defined as the first penetration of the cladding. The most dominating type 
of primary failure today is due to fretting of foreign debris, which circulate in the reactor 
water. These debris can be trapped by the spacers in the fuel assembly or at the bottom/top 
plate and cause through-wall fretting of the cladding [3, 7, 8]. In addition, vibration of the 
rods towards trapped debris, a spacer or an adjacent rod may result in a wear failure. 
There are also other types of failures, such as Pellet Cladding Interaction (PCI), Pellet 
Cladding Mechanical Interaction (PCMI), manufacturing defects, dry out, Enhanced Spacer 
Shadow Corrosion (ESSC), Crud Induced Local Corrosion (CILC), etc [7, 8]. 
If a small fuel failure has occurred, a failed fuel can still be used in the core if no 
significant amounts of iodine or fissile material are released. Although, after a while a 
primary failure can develop into a large open secondary failure (described in 2.2) either in the 
surrounding of the primary failure or at some distance away from it, leading to wash out of 
both volatile and non-volatile nuclides, including large amounts of fission products and fuel 
material.  
2.2 Secondary	fuel	failures	
After a primary failure occurs, steam enters the rod causing fuel and cladding corrosion and 
local hydriding (ZrH2) of the cladding. If there is an open gap between the fuel pallets and the 
cladding, local massive hydriding can also develop through the oxygen starvation [7, 8]. The 
process, thus, begins when coolant enters the fuel rod. The coolant flashes into steam which 
reacts with the fuel pellets and the cladding inner surface. Oxygen is stripped from the steam 
according to the corrosion reactions (1) and (2). Such coolant intrusion into the rod, flashing 
into steam, continues until equilibrium with the system pressure is reached. 
 
૛ࡴ૛ࡻ ൅ ࢆ࢘	 → 	ࢆ࢘ࡻ૛ ൅ ૛ࡴ૛    (1) 
ࡴ૛ࡻ ൅ ૚࢞ࢁࡻ૛ →
૚
࢞ࢁࡻ૛ା࢞ ൅ ࡴ૛		     (2) 
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Normally, zirconium is covered by a thin protective oxide film that protects against 
hydride formation. Steam oxidation of both fuel and inner cladding can generate enough 
hydrogen to break down the protective properties of ZrO2 and to cause excessive hydrogen 
pick-up. Due to the corrosion according to reaction (1), amount of H2 is increasing replacing 
steam, i.e. H2O in the gas phase. The ratio of H2 to H2O vapour increases with distance from 
the initial failure location as time progresses. This is due to the hydrogen diffusion along the 
tight gap between the fuel and the cladding while the steam reacts with the zirconium in the 
cladding wall. At a certain distance from the primary failure, the local partial pressure ratio 
pH2/pH20 might exceed a threshold value of pH2/pH20 above which local massive hydriding of 
the inner surface of the cladding occurs. This causes formation of brittle hydrogen blisters and 
bulges on the rod, due to the hydrogen migration from the hotter inner cladding surfaces to the 
colder outer surfaces. If the hydrated areas are exposed to internal or external stresses, it can 
lead to circumferential breaks or long axial cracks [7, 8].  
The rods with circumferential breaks are sometimes classified by crack extension at least 
halfway around the cladding circumference, or when a rod is broken in two. The criterion for 
long axial cracks has been adopted at the beginning of the 90ths when a crack should be at 
least 6 inches long [9]. Such failures are the result of propagating axial splits caused by either 
PCI cracks or hydride blisters. The growth of a crack is maintained by the hoop stress in the 
cladding due to pellets thermal expansion. Long axial cracks can lead to a significant fuel 
wash out and therefore accounted as one of the most severe fuel failures. 
2.3 Detection	of	fuel	failures	
2.3.1 During	operation	
The release of fission products, fissile material and transuranium nuclides from failed rods 
can be determined by off-gas and coolant activity analyses, which provides means to detect 
the occurrence of a failure and monitor the progression of a failure and its possible 
degradation.  
In the coolant and in the off-gas system there is always some level of activity, induced by 
reactions between neutrons and different nuclides in the core, resulting in the creation of 
radioactive products, e.g. 3H, 16N, 19O, 18F, 13N, 14C, etc. In addition, the activated corrosion 
products, e.g. 51Cr, 54Mn, 59Fe, 58Co, 60Co, 65Zn and 124Sb, would also give a contribution to 
the activity in the coolant and the off-gases [9].    
Another important source of activity in the reactor water is tramp uranium. Fission of 
tramp uranium produces radioactive fission products, causing a built up of activity in the off-
gas system. This is the main source of radioactive iodine isotopes at failure free operation. 
Off-gas activity measurements 
Surveillance of gamma emitting noble gases, the increase of which serves as an indication of 
an occurred failure in the core, is a standard procedure for monitoring fuel rod integrity in 
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most BWRs, since noble gases are the first nuclides to be released in case of a failure. The 
release of the noble gases is caused by fast pressure equilibration between the interior of a rod 
and the reactor pressure. After noble gases enter the coolant, they are transported together 
with a steam to the turbine system, and subsequently further on through the condenser and 
recombiner system before they reach the off-gas system. The transport time to the condenser 
is short (in order of 15-30 s at 100% power) which means that even short-lived nuclides are 
able to reach the turbine [9]. Indication of fuel failure is often an increase in concentrations of 
radioactive noble gases measured in the off-gas system which is the standard procedure         
in BWRs.  
The integrity of the fuel in the core can be monitored by measuring activity increase due to 
increased release of gamma emitting noble gases, such as 133Xe, 135Xe, 135mXe, 137Xe, 138Xe, 
85mKr, 87Kr, 88Kr and 89Kr. Along with measurements of individual nuclides, a method based 
on the “release-to-birth” or “diffusion-to-production” is also implemented, where the ratios of 
long-lived to short-lived isotopes are evaluated, e.g. 133Xe/138Xe, 133Xe/135Xe, 133Xe/137Xe, 
135Xe/137Xe, 88Kr/135Xe [9]. Such diffusion analysis is useful for the surveillance of fuel 
integrity, evaluation of the severity of a failure and distinguishing leaking fuel from tramp 
uranium in the core. Originating from a secondary failure or from tramp uranium in the core, 
more short-lived nuclides of the released noble gas will reach the off-gas system before 
decaying due to the immediate recoil release into the coolant and shorter transportation time 
to the coolant than the activity produced within the primary failed fuel rod due to diffusion 
mechanism. 
Common practice to monitor off-gas activity is by analyzing grab samples or on-line 
measurements. Grab sampling is usually performed by Chemistry department personnel, 
where gas samples are frequently collected from an off-gas flow with different periodicity for 
different NPPs. Analysis of different noble gas nuclides in the samples are carried out with a 
germanium detector at an active laboratory. Gas samples taken from the off-gas system have a 
certain transport time from the core to the sampling point, e.g. 3-15 minutes depending on the 
construction of a plant and location of the grab sampling point. Additional transportation time 
from sampling point to the laboratory also has to be taken into account. This can be seen as 
one of the weaknesses of the method since short-lived nuclides may decay before the sample 
can be analyzed due to the transport from the sampling point to the germanium detectors at 
the laboratories. In addition, a failure can remain undetected in the core for quite some time, if 
the peak of the released noble gases is not observed. Separation of additional primary fuel 
failures from the degradation of already existing failures can also be difficult when only 
analyzing grab samples. 
Continuous measurements or on-line off-gas sampling provides means for monitoring fuel 
integrity in the core. The systems for such continuous measurements can somewhat differ 
between different NPPs. Commonly implemented systems include measurements with      
NaI-detectors and ion chambers installed in several measurement points in the                      
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off-gas system. Some NPPs also use on-line nuclide specific activity measurements of 
gamma-emitting noble gases.  
NaI-detectors are more efficient for detection noble gas activity released at low release 
rates, e.g. due to a small primary failure, or after the delay system where most of radioactive 
gases have decayed, while ion chambers detectors are more suitable for measurements at 
more extensive failures. Usually measuring units, each including NaI-detector and an ion 
chamber, located between the recombinators and the off-gas reactor delay system, measuring 
the activity flow before the delay system. Additional NaI-detector is installed after the delay 
system in order to control the efficiency of the delay system and the gas activity released 
through the stack into the air. These detectors are connected to the control room with 
continuous supervision of the measured data. An alarm sets off if the measurements reach the 
threshold value.   
A system for nuclide specific on-line measurements of gamma emitting noble gases based 
on a high purity germanium (HPGe) detector is an efficient system providing means for 
prompt, detailed and accurate fuel failure detection and evaluation of the failure severity. One 
of such systems is Fuel Integrity Evaluation and Surveillance System (FINESS) [1-3] that was 
developed by L. Sihver et al., at Westinghouse Atom in collaboration with Forsmarks 
Kraftgrupp AB.  
The FINESS system is designed for the detection range corresponding to a release rate of 
0.2-200 MBq/s for 133Xe nuclide, which is equivalent to definition of 0.1-100 standard pin 
holes. The system is optimized for the detection of photon with the energy range of about 80-
600 keV, while maintaining high resolution at high count rates [9]. The hardware of the 
FINESS is based on a digital gamma ray spectrometer with data acquisition system, with a 
built-in planar HPGe detector optimized for the energy of noble gas isotopes of interest 
(mainly the Kr and Xe isotopes), collimator and shielding. Shielding reduces the radiation 
from high energetic photons and suppresses Compton continuum. In addition, there is a 
sample chamber with manually or automatically adjustable volume, which can be optimized 
in order to yield required sensibility over a certain range of energies corresponding to specific 
nuclides. The sample chamber is also equipped with pressure and temperature transmitters. 
FINESS also contains 241Am source and a pulser as an energy reference for internal 
calibration. The HPGe-detector can be cooled by a cryostat with liquid nitrogen or by 
electrical cooling [1-3]. The data is processed by the software Gamma Vision developed by 
ORTEC and a software developed by Westinghouse for normalization of measurements and 
for setting off alarms [1-3]. The analysed data is then transferred to a Microsoft Access 
database where it can be retrieved from for further analysis [1-3]. 
FINESS has also shown to be a useful tool at flux-tilting or PST procedure [3], since the 
optimized prompt measurements can reduce the time needed to complete the test, thus 
reducing costs for the plant and man dose to personnel present during the testing. PST is a 
procedure based on one at a time control rod movements and performed at reduced power 
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(normally between 50 and 80% of nominal power). The main purpose of flux tilting is to 
identify the location of a fuel cell with the leaking fuel rod or at least narrow the leaking area 
in the core. By partly inserting one control rod at the time in the fuel cell the power is 
suppressed locally which changes linear heat generation (LHGR). The insertion of a control 
rod will convey the temperature drop, resulting in shrinking of the pellet and thus opening the 
gap between pellet and the cladding. This improves the communication and distribution of the 
gas in a fuel rod. The effect will be an opposite one later during withdrawal of a control rod, 
e.g. the temperature will increase and pellet swells again. This behaviour cause the cracking 
of pellet releasing the gas from the UO2 matrix to the free volume of the rod and consequently 
to the coolant. These control rod movements cause the cracks open and close, resulting in a 
transient release of noble gases from the failure. Radioactive noble gas released due to this 
cause is then transported to the off-gas system where the enhanced activity registered, 
showing the location of a leaking cell. However, to implement a successful power suppression 
testing test accurately determined delay time is an essential factor, where the delay time is the 
time it takes for gas to be transported from the core to the sampling point. 
Coolant activity measurements 
In addition to the off-gas activity monitoring, analysis of reactor coolant grab samples are also 
performed on a regular basis, where iodine, caesium and neptunium nuclides are monitored in 
order to follow-up a failure and its possible degradation.  
Detection of increased concentration of iodine isotopes in the coolant is a signature of fuel 
in direct contact with the reactor coolant. Release of the long-lived iodine, particularly 131I is 
of concern from the radiological point of view during the outage. The inhaled 131I 
concentrates in the thyroid gland and can cause an enhanced risk of thyroid cancer later in 
life, or even acute health effects. Increase of caesium concentration in the reactor coolant is 
also an indication of a degradation of a failure and an increased water intrusion in the leaking 
fuel rod. Finally, neptunium nuclides in the coolant is an indication of fuel pellets, or fissile in 
direct contact with the coolant with the subsequent wash out of the fissile material from the 
failure. However, neptunium cannot be used as a measure of released amount of fissile 
material if HWC is applied, since then unsolvable neptunium components are also created that 
are not released in the reactor water.  
At some units an increased level of iodine in the coolant is used as an indication of a fuel 
failure instead of the off-gas activity increase. Although this method gives slower response 
and might not be as reliable, since small fuel failures might exist in the core without causing 
an increased level of iodine.  
2.3.2 During	outage	
Sipping is the best method to detect and locate a leaking fuel assembly, however it can only 
be performed during outage when reactor is shut down and the lid of the reactor core is open. 
Often sipping is carried out after the flux tilting in order to verify the location of a failure in 
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the identified area of the core. Sometimes a whole core sipping can be necessary if there is an 
uncertainty in the location of a failure in the core or suspicion of several failures. Sipping is 
implemented at both BWRs and PWRs and often can be done without time loss during the 
fuel shuffling. There are several types of sipping methods that are available, below follows a 
short description of the most common sipping methods [3, 10, 11].  
Elevate sipping. At elevate sipping a hood is placed over the rod, which is then elevated a 
bit (between 0.5 and 4 meters) before the water sampling is performed. The higher the 
elevation the more accurate the results of measurements due to the increase of the internal 
relative pressure of the rods in relation to the water pressure. Water sample is sampled and 
degassed. The gas, released from the leaking rod, is measured with gamma-sensitive NaI 
detector. At the same time water samples are taken out and degassed for nuclide specific 
estimation by measurements with a semi-conductor detector, usually Ge-detector. The method 
is often used in combination with PST/flux tilting. Only the assemblies suspected to be 
leaking and some of the nearby assemblies undergo elevate sipping. 
TELESCOPE sipping. This method was developed by Westinghouse Electric Company 
(former ABB Atom). The technique is based on depressurisation of the elevated rod caused by 
elevation of a fuel assembly. Depending on redistribution or replacement of the fuel assembly 
it elevates 4 or 13 m respectively towards the reactor water surface. The pressure drop will 
cause the outflow of fission products from the failure into the coolant. Pipes collect water 
samples from a water channel inside a fuel assembly (BWR) or from the refuelling machine 
mast (PWR). The water samples are degassed, separating gas incorporated in the collected 
water and activity measurements of the gas are carried out. Gas analysis performed by 
TELESCOPE sipping shows mostly 133Xe-isotope, which is dominating gas nuclide in a 
recently used fuel. This process can also be used for leakage determination on irradiated fuel 
assemblies which have been stored in the storage pool for up to 2-3 years. In that case the 85Kr 
is the gas-isotope to be measured, because of short half-life of 133Xe (5.3 days). The 
advantage of TELESCOPE sipping equipment is usage of two detectors: beta sensitive and 
gamma sensitive. The benefit of beta detector is that it has a low background activity level.  
In-Core or Hood sipping. The technique was developed by General Electrics. The hood 
tightens to the upper end of fuel boxes covering from four to sixteen fuel assemblies at the 
time. By injection of compressed air over the upper part of the fuel stops the cooling water 
flow. This causes an increased heat generation and subsequent increase of temperature inside 
the rod, resulting in release of noble gases from the damaged rod. The collected water samples 
undergoes degassing, and gas activity is measured by the detector connected to the hood or 
analysed in the plant laboratory using spectroscopy. The water communication between the 
assemblies is terminated allowing separated water sampling from each assembly. Hood 
sipping does not affect the fuel by depressurisation as other methods since there is no need for 
moving assemblies or perform an elevation.   
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Canister sipping. This kind of sipping is performed in canisters in the spent fuel pools. By 
raising the temperature and reducing the pressure in the canister the fission products are 
released from a failed rod. Measurements are either carried out by analysing water and gas 
samples on-line or in the active laboratory.  
In addition there are visual inspections performed during outage by using underwater 
cameras inserted in the core. Careful observations of monitored fuel assemblies in order to 
detect abnormalities, as for example gas bubbles from the elevated assembly, help the 
decision of actions to be taken or the interpretation of the sipping results. 
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Chapter	3	
 CONTROL	ROD	FAILURES	
This chapter includes a brief description of the functions of the control rods in the 
core and presents an overview of the mechanisms leading to control rod failures, as 
described in Paper II. Available methods for detection of control rod failures at NPPs, 
presented in Paper II and Paper V, are also covered in this chapter.  
 
The main function of control rods in a nuclear reactor is to shape the power distributions and 
control the reactivity. In a BWR, the output of the thermal power is regulated by control rods 
together with the reactor’s re-circulation pumps. In addition to the regulation of power, 
control rods are also used for shutting down the reactor. The rods that are used for both 
regulating the power and for shutdown of the reactor are classified as regulating rods while 
rods that are only used for shutdown are called shutdown rods. Control rods in regulating 
position are partly to fully inserted in the core during the reactor operation and therefore the 
most exposed ones to the neutron irradiation which causes fast absorber depletion. Shutdown 
control rods are fully withdrawn during operation and are only inserted during the shutdown 
of the reactor. These rods are mostly irradiated at the tip due to neutrons leaking from the 
bottom of the core. Occasionally shutdown rods can also be partly inserted in the core which 
increases the exposure.  
Although there is a number of control rod designs, only the most common designs will be 
described below. Generally control rods used in a BWR have a cruciform shape with four 
wings/blades which are inserted between fuel channels in predefined interstices. Control rods 
are filled with neutron absorber, which in BWRs can be either B4C, a combination of B4C and 
hafnium (Hf), or only Hf. In the. Marathon control rods designed and manufactured by 
General Electrics, a number of thin vertically oriented tubes are welded together forming a 
wing. The tubes are filled with capsules containing B4C powder, Hf rodlets or empty capsules. 
The tubes serve as individual pressure vessels since there is no communication between the 
tubes in a control rod wing. Another common control rod design, used in BWRs is the CR99, 
designed and manufactured by Westinghouse Electric Company. It consists of four stainless 
steel blades with horizontally drilled channels filled with B4C as the neutron absorber. In this 
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design B4C is introduced in form of hot isostatic pressed (HIP) pins. The channels are 
communicating within a blade by a vertical channel on the outer edge of the blade, connecting 
all the channels.  
3.1 Primary	control	rod	failures	
The operational life of a control rod in the core of a reactor is limited by its mechanical 
properties mainly due to a phenomenon called irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking 
(IASCC). IASCC is a failure mechanism which can occur in steel components of a reactor, 
when exposed to a combination of certain conditions, such as extensive radiation, stress and 
corrosive environment. The operational function of a failed control rod is generally not 
affected, although the degradation of a failure and possible subsequent washout of some 
amounts of control rod contents (e.g. absorber material and reaction products) may lead to 
lower efficiency of the reactor due to boron wash out and/or might cause changes of the 
coolant properties, e.g. an increase of coolant conductivity and pH level due to LiOH release.  
Radiation damage 
The influence of the neutron fluence on ISSCC has been well established. Irradiation of 
metallic components of the reactor by neutrons can cause significant changes in the 
mechanical and metallurgical properties, which play a major role in stress corrosion cracking 
resistance. These changes can include radiation hardening, radiation enhanced creep, helium 
and hydrogen embrittlement and radiation induced segregation (RIS) [12]. In case of control 
rods, the effect of segregation is of high importance. When irradiated with fast neutrons, 
displacement of atoms occur creating vacancies and interstitial point defects. The vacancies 
and defects which do not recombine, migrate to surfaces, dislocations and grain boundaries. 
This leads to a redistribution of alloying elements in the material and segregation of 
impurities (e.g. S, Si, Ni, P [13]), creating enriched areas of certain elements near the surface 
or grain boundaries [12, 14, 15]. The conditions for segregation depend also on the ratio 
between temperature and the dose rate [14, 15], as shown in Figure 1. 
Oxidizing environment 
Corrosive environment, which is one of the factors contributing to IASCC, occurs due to the 
radiolysis of reactor coolant water. When water absorbs ionizing radiation present in the core, 
it is dissociated creating molecular, ionic and radical reaction products, such as H2, H2O2, e-aq, 
H, OH, H+, HO2. These products in turn interact, and molecular products H2, O2 and H2O2 are 
formed [12]. Such molecular products affect the electrochemical potential which increases the 
susceptibility to IASCC with increase of dissolved oxygen. Numerous tests have shown that 
electrochemical potential of irradiated stainless steel increases significantly with increasing 
dissolved oxygen while it decreases in the hydrogenated water [12]. During tests performed 
on high-stress material and by applying slow strain rate on post-irradiated material, cracking 
was not observed in hydrogenated water. Material cracking appeared in hydrogenated water 
when a fluence 4 times greater than the fluence caused cracking in oxidizing         
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environment [16]. Another observation that was made shows that critical value for the 
electrochemical cracking potential decreases with increasing temperature [17].  
 
 
Figure 1. Effect of temperature/flux on radiation induced segregation [14, 15]. 
 
Stresses due to boron carbide swelling and helium gas pressure 
The stress inside a control rod is induced by 1) consolidation and subsequent swelling of B4C 
material, in particular if B4C is in form of vibratory compacted powder, and 2) internal 
pressure build-up due to irradiation induced helium generation. The B4C powder consolidates 
into a solid cake under the influence of radiation. This consolidation is already initiated at a 
very low burn up and is the reason why the original free volume of 30% for B4C powder is 
not available for swelling accommodation [18].  
When boron is irradiated by fast and thermal neutrons, reactions (3)-(6) are taking place, 
forming species like helium, tritium, lithium and others [19].  
 
10B + nf → 3H + 2 4He  σ = 2.5 · 10-26 cm2 (Eth 1.0 MeV) (3) 
11B + nf → 3H + 9Be  σ = 1.5 · 10-26 cm2 (Eth 10 MeV) (4) 
10B + nth → 7Li + 4He  σ = 3.8 · 10-21 cm2 (thermal) (5) 
7Li + nf → 3H + n + 4He  σ = 8.5 · 10-26 cm2 (Eth 2.4 MeV) (6) 
 
From the cross sections and threshold energies for the reactions (3)-(6), it is apparent that 
the reaction with thermal neutrons forming helium and lithium is dominating. The most 
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abundant product of these reactions is helium, which is mainly retained within the boron 
carbide structure forming internal pockets in the dislocations and the grain boundaries, as 
shown in Figure 2, which also causes swelling of the absorber material [20].  
 
 
 
Figure 2. TEM image of irradiated B4C and He bubbles [20]. 
 
A fraction of the formed helium diffuses through the boron carbide structure into the inner 
free volume of the rod, contributing to the rod’s internal pressure build up [20, 21]. Due to the 
consolidation the propagation of the swelling neutron absorber into the free volume of a rod is 
limited, causing the increase of stress on the stainless steel of control rod walls [18]. The 
contents of helium in the rod and, subsequently, the swelling of the neutron absorber and the 
internal pressure are increasing with the depletion of boron. 
3.2 Secondary	control	rod	failures	
When a primary crack occurs on a control rod, the gas inside the rod leaks out into the coolant 
due to the overpressure in the rod. Once the pressure equilibrium is reached, the neutron 
absorber becomes is to a coolant. Coolant eventually enters the rod and causes a disintegration 
of the neutron absorber leading to a release of the helium which was captured in the boron 
carbide lattice. Furthermore, small particles that are produced due to the disintegration of the 
absorber material might be washed out into the reactor coolant [18]. Boron can also leak out 
into the reactor water, which might lower the efficiency of the reactor. 
Secondary cracks are either additional cracks that can occur after a primary crack or further 
widening and propagation of an already existing a primary crack. The occurrence of 
additional cracks has been mostly observed in rods containing hafnium due to its expansion as 
a result of the hydriding of the hafnium when in contact with the coolant. This results in 
hafnium crystal structure swelling which induces stress on the walls of a control rod with 
possible cracking [9]. 
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A propagation of cracks occurs due to additional swelling of the material structure inside a 
control rod. This occurs due to a coolant reaction with lithium and formation of lithium 
hydroxide, which has larger volume than lithium, resulting in the swelling acceleration [9].  
3.3 Detection	of	control	rod	failures	
3.3.1 During	operation	
Detection of control rod failures is usually performed by monitoring the tritium activity         
(t ½ = 12.3 years) in periodically taken grab samples of the reactor coolant and charcoal 
samples from the off-gas chimney. Continuous production of tritium in a control rod due to 
irradiation was shown by reactions (3) - (6) and the amount of formed tritium in a control rod 
depends on rods positions in a core, i.e. whether a rod is used is a regulating position or in a 
shut down position. Another method implemented at some nuclear power plants, e.g. at KKL, 
is monitoring of the boric acid level in the coolant. Both monitoring methods assume the 
coolant ingress and release of some amounts of the rod content into the coolant, including 
tritium and boron particles. However, none of these methods gives an immediate indication of 
a failure since samples are only taken once a week or even less frequently. In addition, a 
release of the rod content assumes a disintegration of the boron carbide matrix by the coolant 
water, as e.g. most of the tritium is tied up in the matrix. Such decomposition of the irradiated 
boron carbide structure and subsequent release of material into a coolant are rather slow 
processes. Consequently, the immediate release of tritium from a primary crack would be 
insignificant. The analysis of coolant for increase of tritium or boric acid concentration could 
be further complicated by different amounts of coolant water replaced and refilled due to 
recycling or water leakage which changes the concentration of the species of interest in the 
coolant. 
The detection using monitoring of boric acid in the coolant can be improved by applying a 
plant specific boron mass balance model, as has been done at e.g. KKL, and determining 
boron amount in the coolant water of the reactor, based on the measurements of the boric 
acid. This can give additional valuable information about the severity of a crack and the 
remaining effectiveness of the leaking control rod.  
Although boron in the coolant can also originate from other sources than leaking control 
rods, such as standby liquid control systems, corrosion inhibitors, detergents, etc., the 
difference in isotopic ratio and depletion would point out the origin of the boron present in the 
coolant. 
3.3.2 During	outage	
During outage the most efficient way to reveal cracks in control rods is by visual inspections 
by inserting a camera in the core after that the reactor pressure lid has been removed. It is 
however a time demanding process which might increase the time for outage. There is also a 
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risk of increased man dose rate during such procedure because of the open lid and close 
proximity to the reactor. However, because of the human factor, sometimes cracks can be 
missed and defect control rods left in operation for another cycle.   
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Chapter	4	
 HELIUM	INVENTORY	IN	FUEL													
AND	CONTROL	RODS	
Both fuel and control rods contain helium which would leak out is case of a failure. 
Details regarding helium’s origin and its accumulation during operation in each case 
are presented in this chapter.  
4.1 Helium	inventory	in	fuel	rods	
The amount of helium in a fuel rod is generally considered to be about 80 ml, which will also 
be shown in Sec. 4.1.1 and Sec. 4.1.2. The main contribution to a helium amount contained in 
a fuel rod is due to injection of helium into a fuel rod during the manufacturing process. 
Furthermore, the production of helium in uranium dioxide fuels for BWRs during operation is 
insignificant and can be assumed negligible, as will be shown in Sec. 4.1.2.  
4.1.1 Due	to	fuel	manufacturing	
During fabrication of fuel, inert gas, such as helium, is commonly used for pressurization of 
fuel rods. The gap between pellets and cladding is filled with helium to improve heat transport 
from the pellet and, particularly for PWR fuel, to withstand the higher external coolant 
pressures in the reactor core and prevent tube collapse. The design and requirements for a 
fabricated rod and, consequently, fill up pressure can vary depending on the type of reactor 
the fuel is to be used in, nevertheless, usually BWR fuel rods are pressurized to 3-4 bar 
atmospheric pressure. Using ideal gas law the amount of helium filled in at pressurization can 
be determined if the free volume of a rod and the fill up pressure are known. For a standard 
length rod pressurized to 4 bar, the amount of helium was determined                       
to be 3-4x10-3 moles [4], which corresponds to about 80-100 ml at standard pressure and 
room temperature conditions.  
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4.1.2 Helium	production	during	operation	
The contribution to the helium inventory in the fuel rod during operation is insignificant, since 
only a small part of helium is produced due to the irradiation of the fuel in a reactor. The main 
contributors to the helium production are listed below [4, 22]:  
1) α-decay of transuranic elements, mainly 242Cm and lesser extend of 244Cm  
2) ternary fission 
3)  CnO 1316  
Most of the transuranic elements decay by α-process, where the main contribution of 
helium in UO2 fuels is from 242Cm, which stands for about 90% of the helium production 
from transuranics. The occurrence of 242Cm and 244Cm in the fuel originates from respectively 
241Pu and 242Pu. The production of helium in these cases is related to their short half-lives, 
compared to other α emitting transuranics: 163 days for 242Cm and 18 years for 244Cm. 
Helium production generated due to α-decay of transuranic elements is 0.3% helium atom per 
equivalent fission generated from transuranics. Apparently, generation of helium is 
considerably higher for MOX fuels since larger amount of plutonium isotopes are present in 
the fuel during operation. The neutron capture reaction 16O(n,α)13C, that requires fast neutrons 
with energies higher than 2.36 MeV and generates 0.6% helium atom per equivalent fission. 
Finally, ternary fission also has a low rate of helium atoms generation per fission, about     
0.2-0.3%. Thus, the total helium production in a fuel rod during operation is 1.2% helium 
atom per equivalent fission [4, 22]. This number gives low contribution of helium to the 
build-up of the rod’s internal pressure during operation, however, it might be of concern at a 
long time storage, particularly in case of MOX fuels.  
An example of the accumulation of helium, xenon and krypton with burn-up of the rod is 
illustrated in Figure 3. The example is an output of STAV6 calculation for a selected fuel rod 
of SVEA-96 Optima2 design by Westinghouse Electric Company, with the enrichment of 
235U of 4.9% and fill-up pressure of the rod at room temperature of 0.4 MPa. The assembly, 
which contains the rod chosen for this example, has been in operation for four years and has a 
high average burn-up of 48.7 MWd/kgU. As it can be seen in the diagram the amount of 
helium in a selected fuel rod is 3.5x10-3 moles before the irradiation, i.e. due to fill up at 
fabrication, which is in a good agreement with the numbers given in Sec. 4.1.1. When the 
burn-up reaches almost 48 MWd/kgU, the inventory of helium increased by 0.6 moles, which 
is the amount gained in four years period of time. This corresponds to about 15 ml of helium 
at standard pressure conditions and room temperature. 
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Figure 3. Gas inventory in a fuel rod due to the burn-up [4].  
 
4.2 Helium	inventory	in	control	rods	
The inventory of helium in a control rod is partly from manufacturing and partly from 
accumulation during operation due to the irradiation of boron with neutrons. However, on the 
contrary to the fuel rod, most of the helium inside a control rod is generated during operation.  
4.2.1 Due	to	control	rod	manufacturing	
In the Beginning of Life (BOL), a control rod contains a small amount of helium, which is 
injected during the fabrication of the rod. The amount of helium injected in the rod 
corresponds to a pressure of one atmosphere at room temperature, i.e. control rods are not 
pressurized in the same way as fuel rods. Yet, the injected helium is used for leak testing and 
welding tightness during quality control. A free volume of a tube (design 1) or a wing    
(design 2) of a control rod, described in Ch.3, was difficult to find out, however, it is assumed 
that amount of helium injected in a control rod at manufacturing is negligibly small compared 
to the helium generated during operation.  
4.2.2 Helium	production	during	operation	
When boron carbide is exposed to a neutron fluence, several reactions are taking place, as it 
was described in Sec. 3.1. Based on the cross sections for different reactions, shown in      
Sec. 3.1, it was established that the reaction (5) is the dominating reaction for thermal 
neutrons. As was already mentioned, the generated helium mostly remains in the boron 
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carbide structure, but some part of it is released in the void volume of a tube or a control 
blade, depending on the design of the rod. 
The amount of helium produced due to neutron irradiation 10B during operation and 
subsequently released into the control rod’s void volume, can be determined if the neutron 
absorber (B4C) quantity in the rod is known. The estimation is based on the assumption that 
each 10B atom produces one helium atom when undergoing a reaction with a thermal      
neutron [4].  
The amount of He in the void volume can be estimated according to Eq. (7) [4]. 
 
࢔ࡴࢋ ൌ ࢓࡮૝࡯ࡹ࡮૝࡯ ∙ ࣌ ∙ ࣎ ∙ ࢁ ∙ ࡴࢋ࡮૝࡯,	    (7) 
where 
݊ு௘  – amount of He released into the void volume, (mol), 
݉஻ర஼	 – mass of B4C, (g), 
ܯ஻ర஼  – molar mass of B4C, (g/mole), 
ߪ  – 10B abundance in naturally occurring B, 
߬  – number of B atoms in a B4C molecule, 
ܷ  – 10B depletion, 
ܪ݁஻ర஼  – fraction of He release. 
 
The amount of 1 mole corresponds to a 22.4 l gas at standard pressure and temperature 
conditions (STP), i.e. temperature of 0Ԩ and atmospheric pressure. However, the temperature 
at the sampling point is about room temperature, assume 25Ԩ. Thus, the volume of the 
released gas can be calculated according to Eq. 8. 
 
ࢂࡴࢋ ൌ ࡳ૙ ∙ ܂܂૙ ∙ ࢔ࡴࢋ,     (8) 
where 
ுܸ௘  – volume of He released into the void volume of a blade/tube, (l) 
ܩ଴  – gas volume in 1 mole at STP, (l/mol), 
଴ܶ  – temperature at STP, (273.15 K), 
ܶ  – temperature of interest, (K), 
݊ு௘  – amount of He released into the void volume, (mol). 
 
The release fraction of the generated helium from the boron carbide matrix depends on     
1) boron depletion, and 2) the structural material of the absorber. The gas release from the 
B4C powder is larger compared to that from a HIP pins, which can be obtained using 
respectively Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) [4].  
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ࡴࢋ࡮૝࡯ሺ࢖࢕࢝ࢊࢋ࢘ሻ ൌ ૙. ૙૝ ൅ ૙. ૚૟ ∙ ࢁ	    (9) 
ࡴࢋ࡮૝࡯ሺࡴࡵࡼ	࢖࢏࢔࢙ሻ ൌ ૠ૞૞ࢁ	                        (10) 
where 
ܪ݁஻ర஼ሺ௣௢௪ௗ௘௥ሻ – fraction of He release for B4C powder, 
ܪ݁஻ర஼ሺுூ௉	௣௜௡௦ሻ – fraction of He release for B4C HIP pins, 
ܷ                       – 10B depletion. 
 
The release fraction of helium increases with increased 10B depletion. However, this 
fraction is lower for HIP pins compared to B4C powder due to the higher density of HIP pins. 
Assuming that the mass of B4C powder is less than 200 g in one tube of a control rod of 
Marathon design, helium amount released from a boron carbide structure and present in a void 
volume of a tube can be determined using Eqs. (7)-(9). The results of such calculation are 
shown in Figure 4. In the same way, assuming less than 2.5 kg of B4C in form of HIP pins in 
a CR 99 design control rod [23], and implementing Eqs. (7), (8) and (10), the helium amount 
in a void volume of a CR 99 blade depending on its depletion can be calculated. This is also 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
Using Figure 4 and Figure 5, the amount of helium present in the void volume of a tube or 
a blade in a certain rod which would leak out in case of a failure can be obtained, if the 
average boron depletion of a rod is known. 
In Figure 6 and Figure 7 examples of two of the rod designs used in regulating positions in 
the reactor at KKL are shown. The accumulation of helium in a tube void volume of a 
Marathon control rod can be obtained by using Figure 4 and an average 10B depletion of a rod. 
The average 10B equivalent depletion can be obtained from the 10B nodal depletion calculated 
by Helios/Presto2 code. The average equivalent depletion of a rod is 30.3%. Then the 
expected amount of helium accumulated in each tube of a rod is 1.5 liters, which was 
estimated by the intersection of curves of the released helium and the average 10B depletion. 
In the same way, using Figure 5, the expected amount of helium accumulated in each of four 
blades was determined to be 5.3 liters if the average rod boron depletion of a CR 99 control is 
22.0%, as shown in Figure 7.  
The estimation of the helium amount in a control rod blade based on average 10B depletion 
of the rod is a rough approximation. Since different parts of the rod have different depletion, 
because of the unequal exposure to neutron fluence, helium release fraction might also vary, 
as it is based on the depletion. A better accuracy of helium accumulated in the rod can be 
obtained from the nodal depletion of a rod. In addition, when talking about the equivalent 
average depletion of a Marathon control rod, Hf exposure to the neutron fluence is also taken 
into account. This may lead to some uncertainty, resulting in somewhat higher value for 
helium in a free volume of a rod. This has to be considered when more careful                       
analysis is required.   
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Figure 4. He inventory in a Marathon tube void volume at KKL depending on 10B depletion. 
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Figure 5. He inventory in CR 99 blade void volume used at KKL depending on 10B depletion. 
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Figure 6. He in a tube void volume of a Marathon control rod. 
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Figure 7. He amount in a blade void volume of CR 99. 
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Chapter	5	
 ON‐LINE	MEASURING	SYSTEM															
AT	KKL	AND	FORSMARK	
In this chapter a system for detection of fuel and control rod failure is explained. Such 
a measuring system is installed at KKL and Forsmark 3. Details of each system at 
both NPPs and their differences are given in this chapter. This is also described in 
more or less details in Papers I, III-VII. A general description of how a mass 
spectrometer is working and the technique for measuring helium is also included in 
this chapter.  
 
The measuring system at KKL and Forsmark is a combined detector system for on-line 
measurements of gamma emitting noble gases and helium. On-line spectroscopy for gamma 
emitting noble gases is based on an HPGe-detector, while the helium detection system is 
based on a mass spectrometer. 
5.1 Principle	of	helium	detection	technique	
The most efficient way to detect helium is to use a mass spectrometer. The measurements are 
based on measuring a stream of helium ions, which is proportional to the partial pressure of 
helium in the system. The principle of a detector design is shown in Figure 8. The main 
components of a mass spectrometer are an ion source with a cathode, a magnetic separator 
and an ion collector. Gas molecules flow into the mass spectrometer passing through an 
ionization chamber (3), where the molecules are ionized by the ion source. A filament (1) of 
heated tungsten is usually used as an ion source, which transmits the electron beam, that hits 
the gas molecules to achieve the ionization. These positively charged particles are then 
accelerated in the magnetic field. The purpose of the magnetic field is to deflect the ions and 
to force them to follow a circular path of a certain radius, which depends on mass-to-charge 
ratio (m/e) of the ions. The higher the m/e-ratio, the larger radius of circular path which the 
charged particles will follow. When m/e=4 is selected, which is normally the default setting 
when using a mass spectrometer for helium measurements, only the helium ions can pass the 
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diaphragm (5) and reach the ion collector (“target”). In the ion collector, the stream of ions is 
measured as an electrical current [24, 25]. The triode electrode (4) collects ions of higher 
mass than helium. It is also used for measuring the total pressure inside the analyzing cell. 
Some detectors are also equipped with “braking electrode” (6) placed before the target. Its 
function is to eliminate secondary, low energy ions [24].  
 
 
Figure 8. Operating principle of the analyzing cell of a mass spectrometer [24]. 
 
In order to prevent the measured stream of ions to be disturbed by other particles during 
the operation, the mass spectrometer requires a vacuum level below 1x10-4 mbar. This 
vacuum level is usually provided by the combination of a fore vacuum pump (e.g. rotary vane 
pump) and a turbo molecular drag pump [24, 25].  
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5.2 Measuring	system	at	KKL	
The measuring system at KKL includes a system for on-line measurements of gamma 
emitting nuclides and a system for measuring helium. This combined system for detection of 
fuel and control rod failures at KKL is located in the off-gas system after the condenser, 
recombiner and gas coolers, and before the charcoal filters of the chimney, as shown in  
Figure 9. There are two different measuring modes, depending on the location of sampling. 
The first mode is performing direct measurements, where the off-gases are taken directly after 
the condenser and gas coolers. The second mode is a delayed measurement mode, where the 
sample line is attached to the off-gas flow pipe after an additional delay line, as can be seen in 
Figure 9. The delay line consists of several tanks, allowing short-lived nuclides to decay to 
long-lived daughters or to stable isotopes in the fission products decay chain. The function of 
the delay line at KKL is presented in more details in Paper V. The gas in the sample line is 
flowing through the combined detection system with a constant flow and pressure, regulated 
by electronic flow and pressure regulators. A schematic set up of the measuring system at 
KKL is shown in Figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 9. Schematic set up of the measuring system at KKL. 
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5.2.1 System	for	detection	of	gamma	emitting	noble	gases	
The activity of gamma emitting noble gases at KKL is continuously surveyed by the Abgas 
Online Monitoring (AOM) system which was developed at KKL in 2003-2004. The AOM 
system is similar to the FINESS system described in 2.3, and based on a high purity 
collimated Broad Energy Germanium detector, BEGe, with electrical cooling. BEGe detectors 
are efficient over a broad energy region, which is important for measurements of the relevant 
noble gases [1-3, 5]. The detector is operated by a single unit including high voltage supply, 
amplifier and digital signal processor at once. The communication with the PC runs via a 
USB interface. The gamma spectroscopy software is Genie 2000, developed by Canberra and 
used for continuous measurements and data analysis. The data are stored in a SQL data base. 
The data are visualized in the Core Monitoring System MinuteMan via Ethernet [5]. An 
activity increase of the monitored nuclides (mainly xenon and krypton nuclides and their 
ratios) is a strong implication of a fuel failure. A detailed description of the nuclide specific 
gamma emitting noble gas measuring system and its usefulness for detection of fuel failures 
are given in Paper I and Paper V. Furthermore, Paper I shows the efficiency of the system for 
identification of leaking fuel in the core during PST.  
5.2.2 System	for	helium	measurements		
In September 2008, a helium measuring system was installed in the off-gas system in 
connection to the BEGe detector system. The main purpose of the helium measuring system at 
KKL is monitoring of control rod integrity. The system for helium measurements is based on 
a mass spectrometer which is build-in in a He-leak detector PhoeniXL 300 from Oerlikon 
Leybold Vacuum Company. The vacuum of the analyzing cell is provided by TRIVAC E2 
dual stage rotary vane vacuum pump and TURBOVAC TW 70 wide-range turbomolecular 
pump. In vacuum mode, which is used for measurements at KKL, the minimum detectable 
helium leak rate is 5x10-12 mbar l/s at an inlet pressure lower than 0.2 mbar. The maximum 
helium leak rate, which can be displayed by the detector, is 0.1 mbar l/s. The highest 
sensitivity of the detector is 1x10-12 mbar l/s [25]. 
A gas separation cell with a PTFE membrane and a recorder for data acquisition and 
storage are also included in the helium detection system. To avoid contamination of the 
helium leak detector with radioactive noble gases present in the off-gas system, and provide 
stable conditions for the detector operation, a gas separation cell is installed before the 
detector inlet. A schematic set up of the gas separation cell is shown in Figure 10. A detailed 
description of the cell and its purpose is given in Paper V. Gas is flowing through the upper 
part of the gas separation cell with constant flow of 2 l/min at an absolute pressure of          
500 mbar. The data recorder is connected to the Ethernet, and the accumulated data is stored 
in a file by the recorder and on a server where it can be retrieved for further analysis.  
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Figure 10. Schematic set up of the gas separation cell. 
 
5.3 Measuring	system	at	Forsmark	NPP	
The detection system at Forsmark 3 combines measurements of the gamma-emitting noble 
gases and measurements of helium. The combined on-line system is installed in the off-gas 
system, after the recombiner and gas coolers and before the delay system, as shown in      
Figure 11. The delay system at Forsmark 3 consists of two sand tanks and several charcoal 
columns, which ensures the separation and recirculation of long-lived Xe isotopes and delays 
other harmful radioactive fission gases causing their disintegration. The flow and pressure of 
the gas in the sample line passing through the measuring system are regulated by valves. A 
flow meter is installed for the monitoring of the gas flow rate through the sampling line. 
Extensive description of the measuring system at Forsmark 3 NPP is given in Paper VI. 
5.3.1 System	for	detection	of	gamma	emitting	noble	gases	
At Forsmark NPP the FINESS [1, 2] system is used as the nuclide specific measuring system 
for gamma emitting noble gases in the off-gas system. A detailed description of the FINESS 
system can be found in Sec. 2.3.1. However, the system used at Forsmark differs from the 
original system by some modifications that are presented in Paper VI, e.g. the HPGe detector 
used at Forsmark is not a planar detector. Furthermore, the system at Forsmark has a rigid 
non-adjustable collimator. An 241Am source is available for internal calibration at the low 
energy part of the gamma spectrum, while the energy pulser with variable intensity for upper 
energy calibration, which is present in the original version of FINESS [1, 2], is not included in 
the installation. The measured data is stored at a PC. It can later on be extracted on an external 
HD connected to the USB port for further analysis. 
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Figure 11. Schematic set up of the measuring system at Forsmark 3. 
  
5.3.2 System	for	helium	measurements		
The system for helium measurements at Forsmark 3 is a demo system installed in 2010, in 
connection to the FINESS system, as shown in Figure 11. The main purpose of the helium 
measuring system at Forsmark 3 is to aid detection of fuel failures and separation of primary 
fuel failures from the degradation of already occurred failures that are detected by the on-line 
gamma emitting noble gas measurements. The helium measuring system includes a helium 
leak detector with a built-in mass spectrometer and a stainless steel gas separation cell, in 
similarity to the system at KKL. The detector used at Forsmark 3 is Adixen ASM 142 helium 
leak detector from Alcatel Vacuum Technology Company. The analyzing cell includes dual 
filaments. The required vacuum for the analyzing unit is provided by a rotary wane pump and 
a molecular drag pump. The detector is operating in a vacuum mode allowing the highest 
sensitivity of 1x10-11 mbar l/s, which is also the lowest detectable leak rate according to the 
documentation. The measured data are stored at a PC where it can be extracted for further 
analysis.  
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Chapter	6	
 FACTORS	INFLUENCING	HELIUM	
MEASUREMENTS	
This chapter is based on Paper III and Paper VII, where the factors, which influence 
the helium measurements are analyzed. These factors may vary for different NPPs, 
which is also discussed regarding KKL and Forsmark 3.  
 
During this project, several factors that might have an influence on the measurements with 
helium detector were distinguished. These factors can be categorized into two groups: 1) local 
adjustments made on the sampling line connecting the detector to the off-gas system, and      
2) plant operational parameters.  
6.1 Influences	due	to	sampling	line	adjustments		
During the measurements there are certain conditions regarding gas flow rate, pressure and 
temperature in the sampling line and subsequently in the gas separation cell. The stability of 
these parameters is obtained by controllers and measuring devices. However, adjustments 
made on the sampling line might have a direct affect on the gas separation cell and the 
conditions for helium measurements. To examine how the helium measurements are affected 
by variations in the gas flow rate and gas pressure in the sampling line, experiments at KKL 
were performed where these parameters were changed stepwise. Yet, the results are valid for 
other NPPs with such installations, e.g. Forsmark 3.  
6.1.1 Gas	flow	
Normally the gas flow in the sampling line connected to the helium detector at KKL is about 
2 l/min at 500 mbar absolute pressure. To study the influence of the off-gas flow rate variation 
in the sampling line, an experiment was conducted by increasing the flow rate 5 l/min and 
subsequently decreasing it stepwise with Δ = 1 l/min until it reached 1 l/min at a constant 
pressure, while continuously registering the helium signal. The results, presented in Figure 12, 
showed that the off-gas flow in the sample line does not influence the helium measurements, 
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since no deviation of the leak rate due to the variation in the gas flow rate was detected. 
However, it is important to distinguish between the gas flow rate in the sampling line and the 
total off-gas flow. The variation of the total off-gas flow has a direct influence on the 
measured helium leak rate since it changes the concentration of helium in the system.  
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Figure 12. Influence of the sample line gas flow rate on He measurements. 
 
6.1.2 Gas	pressure	
The dependency between the displayed helium signal and the pressure variation was studied 
at KKL by performing an experiment similar to the one performed when study the effect of 
the flow rate.Usually the gas pressure in the sample line at KKL, where the measurements are 
usually taken, is about 500 mbar. The pressure in the sample line was increased to above    
600 mbar and then decreased stepwise down to just above 200 mbar. From the results of the 
experiment, illustrated in Figure 13, it can be seen that the measured helium leak rate is 
sensitive to the pressure variations. 
From Figure 13 it is clear that the helium signal followed the pressure changes with a 
linear dependence. This is also shown explicitly in Figure 14. From this follows that the 
measured helium leak rate should to be compensated according to the changes of the pressure 
conditions in the sampling line, i.e. with a factor ௉೎ೌ೗௉ೞೌ೘೛೗.೗೔೙೐. Thus, if the calibration of the 
detector was performed at atmospheric pressure (Pcal = 1000 mbar), while the pressure in the 
sampling line is Psampl.line = 500 mbar, the measurements are to be multiplied by factor 2, i.e. ௉೎ೌ೗
௉ೞೌ೘೛೗.೗೔೙೐ ൌ
ଵ଴଴଴
ହ଴଴ ൌ 2. 
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Figure 13. Influence of the sample line pressure on He measurements. 
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Figure 14. Linear dependence of He measurements on the sample line pressure variation. 
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6.2 Influences	due	to	plant	operational	factors	
Our study has shown that the measured helium concentration has a strong dependency on 
some operational factors, e.g. helium impurities in the injected hydrogen gas, variations of the 
total off-gas flow rate, water refill, back flushing of coal colons, etc. 
6.2.1 Hydrogen	injections	at	KKL	
One of the factors that influence the helium measurements is the increase of helium 
concentration in the off-gases due to hydrogen injections. At KKL hydrogen injections started 
in mid-September 2008 [26], as a first step to introduce On-line Noble Chemistry (OLNC). 
Observations in older reactors show that Stress Corrosion Cracking, in particular IGSCC, in 
the primary system can cause severe problems. Adding hydrogen to the feed water reduces the 
production of oxygen in the reactor coolant and lowers the Electrochemical Potential (ECP) in 
the lower part of the core, which mitigates Stress Corrosion Cracking and, therefore, protects 
stainless steel components. However to reduce the IGSCC potential below a critical 
electrochemical corrosion potential (EPC) of a stainless steel, large amount of hydrogen needs 
to be injected [27]. This increases the main steam system radiation dose rate, mainly due to 
16N-γ-radiation [28]. An effective lowering ECP can be achieved by injections of noble metal 
along with small amounts of hydrogen [27]. Therefore, Noble Metal Chemical Addition 
(NMCA) together with small amounts of hydrogen was recommended by GE in 1996.  
Somewhat discontinuous helium measurements prior to the start of the hydrogen injection 
are presented in Figure 15. It shows the background level of helium in the off-gas system 
without the contribution from hydrogen injection. The concentration of helium in the off-gas 
flow during the first half of September was estimated to be about 12-13 ppm. 
Some months later, in January 2009, the hydrogen feed rate was changed stepwise for a 
post OLNC benchmark test. The observed values of the helium concentration, measured 
continuously in the off-gas system, also showed these stepwise variations approximately      
25 minutes after the hydrogen feed rate was changed, as shown in Figure 16. This confirmed 
the presence of helium in the injected hydrogen. One other observation was the variation of 
helium concentration due to the switching of hydrogen trailers, shown as red flags in       
Figure 16. This meant that different trailers contained different amounts of helium. The 
concentration of helium in the injected hydrogen was estimated to be about 100 ppm by 
analyzing corresponding helium measurements.  
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Figure 15. He measurements before the start up of H2 injections at KKL. 
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Figure 16. On-line Noble Chemistry benchmark test at KKL.  
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6.2.2 The	total	off‐gas	flow	
Air is the main component of off-gases and all noble gases (He, Ne, Ar, Kr, Xe and Rn) are 
present in the air with a helium abundance of 5.2-5.6 ppm close to the earth’s surface. Before 
the start up of the hydrogen injections at KKL, helium from the air was the main contribution 
of the helium background in the off-gas system. However, with the change of the water 
chemistry and introduction of hydrogen injection, the background level of helium had 
significantly increased. The flow rate of the air leakage in the condenser has a direct effect on 
the helium signal. The dependence of helium measurements on flow rate variations, when all 
other factors that could influence the helium signal were kept constant, can be seen in    
Figure 17. When the total off-gas flow increased, the concentration of helium decreased and 
vice versa.  
A clear influence of the total off-gas flow on helium signal at Forsmark 3 was observed in 
April 2011, as shown in Figure 18. On April 9 the off-gas flow changed from 20.6 m3/h to 
21.5 m3/h, which resulted in dilution of helium in the off-gas system and thus decrease of 
helium signal from 15.4 ppm to 14 ppm. After the shutdown in April 2011, the reactor started 
with the off-gas flow of 29 m3/h and helium concentration below 10 ppm, which was 
significantly lower than before the shutdown, obviously due to increased off-gas flow rate. 
6.2.3 Feed	water	refill	
At KKL the cold condensate feed into the Hotwell to maintain the required level in the feed 
water tank, could also be observed from the helium measurements in form of dips, as shown 
in the diagram in Figure 19. Due to the injection of hydrogen, containing helium as an 
impurity, the concentration of helium in the off-gas flow was quite high. Consequently, when 
the water from the cold condensate tank entered the Hotwell, a dilution of helium occurred 
due to the degassing of water and, thus, the concentration of helium in the off-gases was 
reduced. From the variation of the helium concentration measured in the off-gases, the time 
interval between each feed water refill at KKL could be estimated to 2.5-4 hours. 
 
The concentration of helium in the off-gas system at Forsmark 3 is low, since the main source 
of the helium is air, which has a helium abundance of ca 5.2-5.6 ppm, as shown in Sec. 6.2.2. 
This is the main contribution to the background level of helium in the off-gas system. There 
might also be small amounts of boron in the reactor coolant that give additional helium in off-
gases. The experiences from our measurements show that the influence of the cold condensate 
feed into Hotwell, i.e. feed water refill, on helium measurements at Forsmark is minor; either 
observed as small variations of helium concentration in the off-gases or not observed at all 
during normal operation of a condenser. However, there have been observations of increases 
of helium concentration if the water level in the condenser decreases faster than during 
normal operation, e.g. caused by a condenser leakage. Such example is illustrated                  
in Figure 20. 
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Figure 17. Influences of the total off-gas flow on He measurements at KKL. 
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Figure 18. Influences of the total off-gas flow on He measurements at F3. 
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Figure 19. Water refill observed from the He measurements at KKL. 
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Figure 20. Water refill and He measurements at F3. 
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6.2.4 	Back	flushing	of	coal	columns		
Another cause of variations in the measured helium signal that have been observed at 
Forsmark 3 is connected to the back flushing of the adsorption columns. After passing the 
condenser, the off-gases flow through recombiner, where oxygen and hydrogen atoms form 
water molecules, which are removed from the off-gas system. Remaining gas enters the delay 
system consisting of two sand tanks and four charcoal columns. The system can be viewed in 
Figure 11. Sand tanks function is to slow down the gas flow and thus reduce the amount of 
short lived noble gases.  
The adsorption columns are filled with activated charcoal and are used for separation and 
recirculation of the long-lived xenon isotopes mainly Xe-133 [29]. Two of the coal columns 
are operated at the same time while two other columns are regenerated. These charcoal 
columns operate in a cycle of 24 hours and are back flushed once a day, which affects the off-
gas gas flow and thereby also the helium measurements. The back flushing means 
regeneration of the column N2 and the part of the off-gas flow, including gamma emitting 
noble gas nuclides, which have not decayed yet, is reintroduced through a column into the 
system and passed on to the ejectors. This recirculation of noble gases forces them through 
the delay system again to achieve the decay of Xe and Kr into harmless nuclides before they 
are released though the stack. The variations of the off-gas flow rate related to the back 
flushing and following steps of the operational cycle of the adsorption columns normally 
observed early in the morning, usually around 07:00 or 08:00 and lasts about 3-3.5 hours. 
This has immediate impact on helium measurements. When the off-gas flow decreases, the 
helium concentration increases and vice versa, as illustrated in Figure 21.  
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Figure 21. The influence of the adsorption column operation on helium measurements at F3. 
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Most often changes could be seen in helium concentration about 9-15 minutes after the 
off-gas flow was changed. The uncertainty could be explained by the recording interval of the 
off-gas flow rate. The available off-gas flow rate data that was recorded with 10 minutes 
intervals until April 21 2011, and after that with intervals of one hour. 
The back flushing procedure affects the activity measurements, resulting in periodic 
increases of activity, as can be seen in Sec. 8.2. in Figure 35, Figure 37 and Figure 39 as has 
been observed in measurements performed by FINESS. Except for the influences from the 
off-gas flow variations, described above, the regeneration of adsorption columns is not 
affecting helium measurements. One suggestion is that since helium is light and volatile gas, 
it is transported through columns quickly. The charcoal columns have the following delay 
efficiency: Kr is delayed about 15 times and Xe about 300 times compared to air delay [29]. 
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Chapter	7	
 EXPERIENCES	OF								
MEASUREMENTS	FROM	KKL	
This chapter is a summary of papers V and VI. It consists of an overview of the 
experiences from helium measurements at KKL, where the detection of control rod 
failures was the main purpose for the installation of a helium measuring system. 
Thorough analysis of such measuring experience is presented in Paper V. 
Furthermore, experiments with helium injections in two different systems and results 
of the experiments are also discussed, although full description of these experiments 
can be found in Paper VI.  
 
7.1 Calibration	of	helium	detector	
The calibration of the helium detector can be performed in two different ways: an internal 
calibration can be carried out by means of a built-in test leak and nn external calibration can 
be performed using a test leak attached to the inlet port [25]. It is recommended by a detector 
vendor to recalibrate every calibrated leak at regular intervals to validate its value [30]. 
7.1.1 Internal	calibration	
Internal calibration is usually performed at start up, yet it can be performed at any time if in 
doubt regarding the proper operation of the detector or as assurance of correct measurements 
during heavy use. However, any calibration, including an internal auto-calibration, can only 
be performed if the detector is not in test mode, which means discontinuity of measurements. 
For internal calibration of PhoeniXL 300 leak detector at KKL a built–in calibration leak of 
type TL7 with leak rate of nominal value of 4.7 x 10-7 mbar l/s ± 15 % at 23°C is used.  
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7.1.2 External	calibration	
For the external calibration, Pfeiffer Vacuum Calibrated helium leak test of permeation type 
CT 408 and leak rate of nominal value of 2.9 x 10-8 mbar l/s ± 15 % at 23°C was used. The 
date of filling given at the standard leak test is 2002.12.16 and the leak rate decrease is less 
than 1 % per year. However, the leak rate is affected by the temperature by +3.5 % per °C 
when it is deviates from the nominal temperature value.  
The temperature in the measurement room at KKL was well above 30°C and the 
temperature at the inlet of the detector was 37°C, which gives a deviation of 14°C from the 
nominal temperature value and consequently 49 % deviation from the standard leak rate. 
Thus, the expected leak rate of the standard leak at 37°C is: 2.9 x 10-8 mbar l/s · 1.49 =      
4.32 x 10-8 mbar l/s ± 15 %, which means that the expected leak rate value should be within 
3.67 x 10-8 and 4.97 x 10-8 mbar l/s. The value obtained by external calibration was            
4.26 x 10-8 mbar l/s, which was within the specified limits.  
7.1.3 Calibration	and	conversion	equation	
The calibration of the helium leak detector with the gas separation cell, including the PTFE 
membrane, was performed at atmospheric pressure (1 bar = 1000 mbar) before connecting the 
detector to the off-gas system of the reactor. A 150 ml gas container was filled with N2, 
thereafter different concentrations of helium were produced by injecting certain amounts of 
helium with a micro syringe into the gas container. To make sure that the results were 
reproducible, several series of measurements were performed.  
The results of the calibration are shown in Figure 22. According to Eq. (11) which was 
obtained by list square fit, the helium concentration can be presented as a linear function of 
the measured helium leak rate. In addition, the results of the measurements are dependent on 
the pressure conditions in the sampling line, which was discussed in detail in Sec. 6.1.2.  
 
ࢉሺࡴࢋࡻࡳሻ ൌ ࡼࢉࢇ࢒ࡼ࢙ࢇ࢓࢖࢒.࢒࢏࢔ࢋ 	૚. ૙ ∙ ૚૙
ૢ ∙ ࡸࡾሺࡴࢋሻ,   (11) 
where  
ܿሺܪ݁ைீሻ	   – concentration of He in the off-gases, (ppm), 
௖ܲ௔௟ሺൌ 1000	ܾ݉ܽݎሻ  – pressure at the calibration of the detector, (mbar), 
௦ܲ௔௠௣௟.௟௜௡௘   – pressure in the sampling line, (mbar), 
ܮܴሺܪ݁ሻ   – measured He leak rate, (mbar l/s). 
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Figure 22. Linear dependence between concentration and leak rate. 
 
7.2 Helium	measurements	during	operation	
The shape and duration of the peaks and the amounts of the helium released due to leaks from 
failed control rods vary depending on the conditions of the failed rod (e.g. 10B depletion of the 
rod, severity of cracks) and eventual changes in the core (e.g. power variations, control rod 
movements). In addition to the release of helium from failed rods, there are also other sources 
that may cause deviations of the helium signal from the background/baseline and have to be 
taken into consideration. As was described in Sec. 6.2.1 and Paper III, the main contribution 
to the background helium concentration originates from helium impurities in the hydrogen, 
injected into the feed water when applying OLNC water chemistry. Other factors that have 
shown to have an influence on helium measurements are variations of gas pressure in the 
sampling line, changes of off-gas flow and water refill into the feed water.   
7.2.1 Method	for	analysis	of	the	measured	data	
By determining and implementing calculations of a continuous helium background level 
(baseline) of helium concentration in the off-gases, the surveillance of the eventual helium 
release can be more accurate. In addition, if such calculated baseline is programmed in and 
calculated for each measured value of helium concentration, it will allow on-line analysis and 
prompt calculations of the released helium amounts.  
As was described in Sec. 6.2.1 and in Paper III, there are several factors that may have an 
influence on the helium concentration. Subsequently, the estimation of helium baseline 
includes several terms as shown in Eq. (12) where the main influencing factors are taken into 
consideration: 1) deviations of the helium baseline due to the variations of the off-gas flow 
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rate, 2) helium baseline response to the changes in H2 feed rate, and 3) stepwise influence on 
the helium baseline due to H2 trailer switching.  
 
ࢉࡴࢋ࡮ࡸሺ࢚૛ሻ ൌ 	 ࢉࡴࢋ࡮ࡸሺ࢚૚ሻ ∙ ࡲࡻࡳሺ࢚૚ି࢚ࢊࡻࡳሻࡲࡻࡳሺ࢚૛ି࢚ࢊࡻࡳሻ 	൅ 	૛. ૠૠ ∙ 	∆	ࡲࡴ૛ሺ࢚૛ሻ ൅	∆ࢉ࢚࢘ࡴࢋሺ࢚૛ሻ,  (12) 
where 
∆	ࡲࡴ૛ ൌ 	ࡲࡴ૛ሺ࢚૛ െ ࢚ࢊࡴ૛ሻ െ	ࡲࡴ૛ሺ࢚૚ െ ࢚ࢊࡴ૛ሻ	,		   (13) 
∆	ࢉ࢚࢘ࡴࢋሺ࢚૛ሻ ൌ 	࢓ࢋࢇ࢔ሾ	ࢉࡴࢋሺ࢚૛ െ ࢚࢓૚ሻሿ െ 	࢓ࢋࢇ࢔ሾ	ࢉࡴࢋሺ࢚૛ ൅ ࢚࢓૛ሻሿ			 (14) 
ܿு௘ಳಽሺݐ2ሻ –  He concentration (baseline) in off-gas system at time t2; (ppm), 
ܿு௘ಳಽሺݐ1ሻ –  He concentration (baseline) in off-gas system at time t1, (ppm), 
ܨைீሺݐ1 െ ݐௗைீሻ  –  off-gas flow rate at time t1- tdOG, (kg/h), 
ܨைீሺݐ2 െ ݐௗைீሻ   –  off-gas flow rate at time t2- tdOG, (kg/h), 
ݐௗைீ  –  delay time for off-gas flow, 
ܨுమሺݐ1 െ ݐௗுଶሻ  –  H2 feed rate at time t1- tdH2, (m3/h), 
ܨுమሺݐ2 െ ݐௗுଶሻ	   – H2 feed rate at time t2- tdH2, (m3/h), 
ݐௗுଶ  –  delay time for H2 feed rate, 
∆	ܿ௧௥ு௘ሺݐ2ሻ  – correction of He concentration baseline at time t2 due to trailer 
switching, (ppm), 
݉݁ܽ݊ሾ	ܿு௘ሺݐ2 െ ݐ௠ଵሻሿ –  mean value of the He concentration over a suitable period before 
the step change of He signal due to a trailer switching, (ppm),  
݉݁ܽ݊ሾ	ܿு௘ሺݐ2 ൅ ݐ௠ଶሻሿ  –  mean value of He concentration over a suitable period after
 a step change of He signal due to a trailer switching, (ppm),  
ݐ2 െ ݐ௠ଵ – period suitable for averaging He concentration before a step change of 
He signal at t2 due to a trailer switching,  
ݐ2 ൅ ݐ௠ଶ – period suitable for averaging He concentration after a step change of He 
signal at t2 due to a trailer switching.  
 
The first term of Eq. (12) shows the inversely proportional dependency of helium 
measurements on the off-gas flow. Furthermore, the fact that the measuring point for the off-
gas flow rate is situated before the delay line, while the helium measurements are usually 
performed after the delay line, has to be taken into account when analyzing the data. Thus, a 
helium concentration at time t1 corresponds to the off-gas flow rate at time (t1- tdOG), where 
tdOG is the delay time for off-gas flow, e.g. transport time through the delay line.  
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The second term of the Eq. (12) gives the dependency of helium measurements on the 
hydrogen feed rate. To determine the dependency of helium concentration on the hydrogen 
feed rate a period in January 2009, which is shown in Figure 16, was used. During this period 
the hydrogen feed rate was changed stepwise with the injection performed using the same 
trailer, i.e. no trailer switching occurred, eliminating the uncertainty caused by the variation of 
helium concentration in different trailers containing hydrogen. A linear approximation of 
values was obtained by list square fit and expressed by equation shown in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23. Linear approximation of He concentration in the off-gases due to injected H2. 
 
The point for hydrogen injections into the feed water is situated before the reactor, which 
has to be considered when analyzing the helium measurements and estimating the helium 
concentration baseline. Therefore, when performing helium sampling after the delay line, the 
variation in the hydrogen feed rate is usually observed in the helium signal about 30 minutes 
later, which is the delay time for hydrogen at the off-gas flow rate of about 45 kg/h. The delay 
time for hydrogen injections is about 13 minutes for helium measurements sampled before the 
delay line. 
Finally, the third term of the Eq. (12) expresses the influence of hydrogen trailer switching 
on helium measurements. It is usually observed as a step change of the helium signal, which 
appears about 30 minutes after the switching, when the off-gas flow is ca 45 kg/h. The value 
of this step, Δctr(He), is the difference between the mean value of the measured He signal over 
certain periods before and after the change due to the switching. If the switching of a trailer 
containing hydrogen occurred at time ttr and t2=ttr+tdH2 , then a step change of the helium 
concentration due to hydrogen trailer switching can be calculated using Eq. (14). 
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The calculation of the integrated helium amount corresponding to a peak of helium 
concentration in the off-gas system, probably released from a failed rod, can be done 
according to Eq. (15). The measured values, with the subtracted baseline calculated using Eq. 
(12), are multiplied by the off-gas flow rate and time intervals between the sampling points. 
The amounts of the measuring intervals are then summed up over the duration of the increase. 
 
ࢂሺࡴࢋሻ ൌ ∑ ሾࢉ࢏ሺࡴࢋࡻࡳሻ െ ࢉሺࡴࢋ࡮ࡸሻሿ ∙ ૚૙ି૟ ∙ ࡲࡻࡳܑ ∙ ࢚	܂/ܜܑ ,   (15) 
where  
ܸሺܪ݁ሻ  – released He amount, (ml), 
ܶ  – duration of the He peak, (s), 
ܿ௜ሺܪ݁ைீሻ  – measured concentration of He in the off-gases, (ppm), 
ܿሺܪ݁஻௅ሻ  –He baseline in the off-gases, (ppm), estimated using Eq. (12) 
ܨைீ௜  – off-gas flow rate, (ml/s), 
ݐ  – sampling rate, (s). 
 
The off-gas flow rate ܨைீ in Eq. (15) takes the delay time, i.e. the transportation time between 
the core and the sampling point, and is given in ml/s with the account of air density at room 
temperature, ρ ൌ 1.204	mଷ/kg. The sampling rate between registered values at normal on-
line measurements is usually 5 minutes, i.e. ݐ ൌ 300	ݏ, which can be adjusted according to 
requirements.  
7.2.2 Analysis	of	measurements	and	interpretation	
Since during this project KKL did not experience any fuel rod failures, any helium 
concentration increase detected in the core was from failed control rods.  
Spontaneous helium release peaks 
Helium peaks that have not been influenced or triggered by operational actions, such as power 
reduction or control rod movements, are called spontaneous helium release peaks. These 
spontaneous peaks could be indications of newly occurred control rod cracks or a helium 
release from the disintegrated B4C matrix due to water intrusion. Examples of significant 
helium releases from failed control rods can be seen in Figure 24 and Figure 25, where the 
duration of the peaks and the determined amount of the released helium are shown. In    
Figure 24 the peak has a narrow and well defined shape, while in the Figure 25 the peak is a 
result of a steep increase of the helium concentration, followed by a slow decrease of the 
signal. However, the most interesting observation was that after the peak the signal remained 
increased over the baseline with several ppm (from 101 ppm before the peak to 106 ppm after 
the peak) for additional 42 hours, as can be seen in Figure 25. This suggests that there was a 
continuous release of small amounts of helium into the reactor coolant. Detailed analysis of 
spontaneous releases and more examples can be found in Paper V. 
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Figure 24. Helium concentration increase in the off-gas system of KKL. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25. Helium concentration increase in the off-gas system. 
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Helium release due to power variations and control rod movements 
Helium release from leaking control rods can also be associated with operational factors such 
as variations of the reactor power level and movements of control rods. Most often during 
such release, the increase of the helium concentration is within 20 ppm above the baseline, 
with a relatively short duration (usually less than 2 hours). This suggests that the amount of 
released helium is considerably less compared to the spontaneous releases, shown in      
Figure 24 and Figure 25. Examples of helium releases induced by the changing of the 
operational conditions (e.g. power variation, control rod movements, etc) are shown in Figure 
26 and Figure 27. Figures include the peak duration and the determined amount of the release 
helium according to Eq. (15), along with the possible causes of the release 
Such behavior of the helium signal implies a partial release from already existing failures, 
while the main release of helium had already occurred during the original crack. In control 
rods containing boron carbide, there is a continuous production and subsequent accumulation 
of helium, while being irradiated by neutrons. A release of the accumulated helium may occur 
again when the operational conditions around a failed control rod are changed due to the 
reduction of power level or the movement of a control rod which causes local power changes. 
Figure 26 visualizes the increase of helium concentration due to power reduction, while in 
Figure 27 the helium release was caused by both power reduction and control rod movements. 
The release of helium shown in Figure 27 increased in two steps, the first step of increase was 
due to the power reduction and the second was due to control rod movement. The measured 
increases in helium concentration at KKL appeared 20-30 minutes after power reduction to 
97.5 % of the full power level. While power was reduced, tests of control rods in regulating 
position were performed with movement of one notch, which also resulted in helium release 
with approximately the same delay time as for power reduction. For more detailed 
explanation and examples, see Paper V.  
Another case of unstable behavior of the helium detector signal with a significant increase 
of helium concentration in the off-gas system, shown in Figure 28, was observed for more 
than one month following the start-up of the reactor after the outage. The baseline was 
determined according to Eq. (12) in Sec. 7.2.1, taking into account a decreasing off-gas flow 
and several switches of hydrogen trailers. Important operational parameters as reactor power, 
off-gas flow, hydrogen feed rate, trailer switches and control rod movements are also 
visualized in Figure 28. 
The amount of helium released during the first month was estimated to be ca 190 liters and 
during the second month to about 90 liters, using Eq. (15). In total, a release of 280 liters 
helium was observed after the start up during these 50 days. Fast elevation and prolonged 
increase of the helium concentration in the off-gases could be explained by several leaking 
control rods present in the core. Simultaneously with the helium, an increase of boron in the 
reactor water was detected. This indicated the presence of more severely failed control rods. 
Using the boron balance model of KKL, described in Paper V, a helium amount, that 
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corresponds to a boron wash out in the coolant of more than 700 g, could be determined to 
190 liters. This calculation assumed an average 10B depletion of 57%, based on the 
measurements of reactor water during this cycle. Considering that not all of the cracks that are 
leaking helium would result in washout of boron, the estimation of the helium amount from 
the boron in the coolant is reasonable compared with the amount determined from the helium 
measurements in the reactor off-gas system.  
 
 
Figure 26. Helium concentration increase due to power reduction. 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Helium concentration increase due to power reduction and control rod movements. 
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Figure 28. Helium concentration increase over a two months period after the start-up. 
 
7.2.3 Experiments	with	helium	injections	
At KKL, two experiments with helium injections were performed, that are described in detail 
in Paper VI. During the first experiment helium was injected into the container, usually used 
for manual grab samples, in order to study the influence of the delay line on the helium 
measurements and the shape of the signal. In another experiment, conducted at KKL, helium 
was injected into the feed water line using the dosage line for platinum injections during 
OLNC, where the gas was transported to the feed water line and subsequently to the reactor 
by deionized water with low flow rate. In addition to the investigation of the ability for 
measuring helium released from a fuel failure, the behavior and spreading of the gas passing 
through the delay system before it reached the measuring point were studied along with the 
recovery rate of injected to the detected helium amount. 
Helium injections in the off-gas grab sampling point  
The aim of the experiment at KKL was to examine the possibility of measuring the helium 
amounts that would correspond to a release from a fuel rod failure, evaluate the influence of 
the delay line on the helium measurements and to study the spreading of helium when it is 
transported through large systems before reaching the sampling point. The evaluation of the 
influence of the delay line and the choice of an optimal measuring point for helium sampling 
was performed by using the same injected helium measured at two different sampling points, 
before and after the in delay line. 
Helium volumes of 20 cm3 and 40 cm3 (i.e. 1/4 and 1/2 of helium volume in a fuel rod at 
STP) were injected with a syringe into a small container with a volume of about 750 cm3, 
where grab samples are normally taken. Because of the under pressure in the line                
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(Pabs ≈ 230-250 mbar), the gas was sucked in and transported to the collecting pipe for non 
condensable gases of the condenser, thereafter passing through ejector, recombiner and gas 
cooler before reaching the measuring point. The helium was injected in series of three for 
each amount. First the system was switched to perform direct measurements, i.e. measure 
before the delay line. When an increase was registered and the measured signal decreased 
back to the baseline level, the sampling was switched in order to detect the same injection of 
helium after the delay line. The measurements were performed with a frequency of 5 seconds 
for improved resolution of the experimental results. Results of the experiment are shown in 
Figure 29 and can be viewed in a Table 2 in Paper VI. 
As can be seen in Figure 29, the measured values due to the injections of 20 cm3 and       
40 cm3 could be fully observed in both cases, when measuring before and after the delay 
system. The peaks measured before the delay system (1BF – 6 BF) were higher and narrower 
while the peaks measured after the delay line (1AF – 6AF) were, as expected, much lower and 
more spread in time.  
 
 
Figure 29. He measurements during He injections into the off-gas                                       
grab sampling point at KKL. 
 
The detector response was observed already 60-75 seconds after the injection, when 
measuring before the delay system, while when measuring after the delay line, the increase 
was registered after about 18 minutes. The duration of the peaks also showed an influence of 
the delay line on the gas transport and subsequently on the duration of peaks, as the duration 
of peaks increased with almost 11 minutes for each case. The thorough analysis of the 
detector response, the delay time estimation and duration of the peaks can be seen in       
Paper VI. 
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The amount of measured helium was 25-40% higher than injected, when measuring both 
before and after the delay, as can be seen in Table 2 in PaperVI. These results are of course 
unexpected, as recovery rates lower than 100 % is expected particularly in case of delay mode 
measurements. The experiment showed that injected amounts of 20 and 40 ml helium 
injections were detected as well-defined peaks with good reproducibility. The heights of the 
peaks, from the measurements before and after the delay line, showed very little discrepancy. 
The influence of the delay system on helium measurements was shown in the spreading of the 
gas and the heights of the peaks, which is analyzed in Paper VI.  
The helium detection system has shown very good efficiency in detecting small variations 
in helium concentrations in the off-gases. Thus, in case of a fuel failure, where the leakage 
would correspond to the injected amounts, i.e. 20 ml and 40 ml, there is a fair possibility that 
a primary fuel failure would be detected with this system. However, additional experiments 
with helium injection into the feed water were needed in order to examine the influence of the 
reactor, turbine and condenser on the gas transport before any conclusions about the detection 
of helium from a fuel failure could s be drawn.  
Helium injections into the feed water  
The aim of the experiment was to simulate a fuel failure by injecting helium in the feed water, 
let it pass through the reactor core and subsequent systems, and finally measure the helium 
increase with a helium leak detector. The point for injection was chosen in close vicinity to 
the reactor core, which is normally used for platinum injections during OLNC. Because of the 
implementation of the HWC and OLNC at KKL, injection of helium followed by high 
pressured nitrogen, was ruled out in order to prevent a radiation increase due to activation of 
additional nitrogen because of the HWC.  
The loop for helium injection was constructed with suitable Swagelock valves and a 
metallic tube with diameter of 4 mm, as shown in Figure 30 and Figure 31. A sensitive fine 
scaled manometer and a helium tube were also attached to the equipment. The volume of the 
loop of 29-30 ml was established by filling the loop with water and weighing the collected 
water afterwards. A constructed loop was then tested to withstand pressure of 100 bar and 
connected to the valves (V4) and (V5) of the platinum injection line, as shown in Figure 31. 
The details of experimental equipment and platinum line can be seen in Paper VI, where the 
sequence of the experiment and uncertainties during the performance are discussed.  
During the experiment, the loop (L1) was filled with helium, thereafter deionized water 
entered the loop and compressed the injected helium. When the valve (V5) was opened, the 
helium from the loop was pushed through the platinum injection line into the feed water pipe. 
After each injection, the water from the loop was collected through the drain for control of the 
volume carried out following weighing. Several injections were made in this manner, where 
the loop (L1) was pressurized with helium three times to 2 bar; one injection was made with 
helium of 4 bar, and, finally, three additional helium volumes of 8 bar absolute pressure were 
injected. 
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Figure 30. The loop constructed for injection of helium into the feed water at KKL. 
 
 
 
Figure 31. Schematic experimental set up for injection of helium into the feed water at KKL. 
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During the experiment, the sampling was performed with the frequency of 5 seconds in the 
direct measuring mode, i.e. measuring before the delay line. The time of the injections was 
registered by a stop clock for establishing the time from the injection to the increase of the 
signal registered by the helium measuring system. The graphical representation of the 
experimental results is illustrated in Figure 32. In Paper VI diagrams for selected time periods 
for the helium injections along with the summary of the results in Table 3 are presented.  
 
 
Figure 32. He measurements during to He injections into the feed water at KKL. 
 
During the first day of the experiment, the increase of the signal was observed 9-10 
minutes after the time of each injection, while on the second day of the experiment the 
response time shortened to 6-7 minutes. As can be read in Paper VI, it was established that the 
injected gas should be transported to the feed water pipe in about 3.5 minutes seconds, not 
taking into account the additional time caused by gas passing through check valves and 
possible time delays due to curvature of the line. In addition, there are also some uncertainties 
in the length and diameter of the line, which might influence the gas transportation time. 
The duration of the increase was surprisingly prolonged, where the shape of the peak was 
considerably spread in time: about 1 hour for the smallest injections and more than 2 hours for 
larger amounts of the injected helium. Such spreading of the signal could suggest that the 
injected helium was not transported to the feed water and subsequent systems as one cohesive 
gas bubble, but was delayed somewhere in the bending or by the check valves connecting the 
platinum injection line to the feed water pipe. The parts of the gas bubble were then slowly 
washed out with the flowing by water. In addition, there might have been some dissolution of 
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helium in the water. Although helium has very low solubility in water, the solubility 
considerably increases with the pressure [31]. 
The recovery rate, i.e. the ratio of measured to injected amounts, of some injections was 
higher than 100%, although in some cases it was only 80 % of the injected amount. This 
suggested that not all of the helium followed to the feed water pipe, but some helium stuck 
somewhere as a gas pocket and was released later on. The sum of the measured amounts is 1.1 
factor larger than the injected amounts, as can be seen in Paper VI. A similar phenomenon 
was observed earlier during injections into the grab sampling point at KKL, where the factor 
was 1.3. To obtain conversion equation Eq. (11) only one rough calibration was performed. 
To get a better correlation, a calibration with a series of standard calibration gases has to be 
conducted. So far mainly the release trend was watched and a rough estimation of the helium 
amount was calculated.  
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Chapter	8	
 EXPERIENCES	OF													
MEASUREMENTS	FROM	FORSMARK	
In this chapter a brief summary of papers VI and VII are given. The chapter includes 
a section on calibration of the detector and the conversion formula. The experiences 
from helium measurements at Forsmark 3, where the helium measuring system was 
installed to improve fuel failure detection, are also descrived. More detailed 
evaluation of the experiences is given in Paper VI. Additionally, an experiment where 
helium was injected into the feed water system is also presented, although a complete 
description of these experiments can be found in paper VI.  
8.1 Calibration	of	helium	detector	
The calibration of the helium detector can be performed in two different ways: internal and 
external calibration. An internal calibration can be carried out by means of a built-in test leak. 
An external calibration can be performed by using a test leak attached to the inlet port [25]. It 
is recommended by a detector vendor to recalibrate every calibrated leak at regular intervals 
to validate its value [30]. 
8.1.1 Internal	calibration	
The Adixen ASM 142 helium leak detector used at Forsmark 3 is equipped with a built-in 
internal calibration leak of the order of 1 x 10-7 mbar l/s. An internal calibration of the 
detector at Forsmark is automatically activated during the start up of the detector. It is 
however, recommended to perform the internal calibration on a regular basis to verify a 
proper operation of the detector, particularly at heavy use. Yet, to perform a calibration, the 
measuring mode has to be interrupted, which will cause discontinuity of measurements.  
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8.1.2 Calibration	and	conversion	equation	
Before installing the detector and connecting it to the off-gas system of the reactor, the 
calibration of the helium leak detector with the gas separation cell including PTFE membrane 
was performed at standard pressure. The objective of this calibration was to obtain a relation 
in the form of a conversion formula between the detector signal (mbar l/s) and the helium 
concentration in the off-gases (ppm). The calibration was performed with four predetermined 
helium concentrations: 50 ppm, 500 ppm, 5000 ppm and 50 000 ppm = 5 %, delivered by the 
AGA Company in the mini flasks pressurized to 10 bar. 
After performing a tightness test of the gas separation cell, gas of each concentration was 
injected several times. In order to provide a gas flow through the gas separation cell, a hose 
pump was connected to one of the openings on the upper part of the gas separator. Thereafter 
the gas was injected into the other opening. This resulted in a steady flow of gas through the 
cell and improved the reproducibility of the signal. 
The detector signal is linearly proportional to the helium concentration of the gas sample. 
The helium concentration of the gas samples used for calibration differed from each other by 
a factor of 10, i.e. 50 ppm, 500 ppm, 5000 ppm and 50000 ppm. A factor of 10 was also 
registered in the detector signal which is illustrated in Figure 33. A linear dependence 
between average values of the detector signal and helium concentration was obtained by list 
square fit approximation, see Eq. (16). 
 
ࢉሺࡴࢋࡻࡳሻ ൌ ࡼࢉࢇ࢒ࡼ࢙ࢇ࢓࢖࢒.࢒࢏࢔ࢋ 	૚. ૝ ∙ ૚૙
ૢ ∙ ࡸࡾሺࡴࢋሻ,   (16) 
where  
ܿሺܪ݁ைீሻ	   – concentration of He in the off-gases, (ppm), 
௖ܲ௔௟ሺൌ 1000	ܾ݉ܽݎሻ – pressure at the calibration of the detector, (mbar), 
௦ܲ௔௠௣௟.௟௜௡௘   – pressure in the sampling line, (mbar), 
ܮܴሺܪ݁ሻ   – measured He leak rate, (mbar l/s). 
 
8.2 Helium	measurements	during	operation	
The installed helium measuring system at Forsmark is mainly focusing on improving the 
detection of fuel failures, as was described in Sec. 5.3.2. After that all the control rods at 
Forsmark 3 have been replaced in recent years due to design construction issues, no control 
rod failure has been detected in the core, based on measurements of helium in the off-gases 
and tritium in the reactor coolant.  
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Figure 33. Linear dependence between concentration and leak rate. 
 
8.2.1 Method	for	analysis	of	the	measured	data	
The estimation of the helium amount released from the core follows the same approach as at 
KKL. However, in case of Forsmark, the background concentration is not affected in the same 
way. The background level is low and stable and can be assumed to be a straight line, which 
simplifies the calculation. Thus, Eq. (15) introduced in Sec. 7.2.1 can also be applied for the 
calculations of the released helium amount at Forsmark. Under stable conditions the 
background level can be taken as the last value before the detected increase, but if the baseline 
is unstable, an average value over a certain period should be taken.  
8.2.2 Analysis	of	the	measurements	and	interpretation	
While a primary failure is usually characterized by a sudden release of long-lived nuclides 
accumulated in the fuel rod, an open secondary/degraded failure causes an increased release 
of short-lived nuclides, since they will not have enough time to decay before reaching the 
measuring point in the off-gas system. Due to the short half-life of Xe-138 (t1/2=14 min.), an 
increase of that nuclide usually suggests that there is a release from an open fuel failure or 
from washout of fissile material from an existing failure. At Forsmark 3, there were periods 
with a measured increase helium concentration, suggesting a possible release of helium in the 
core after the installation of the helium measuring system. During one month, an increase of 
the helium detector signal was detected twice. The first increase was registered for more than 
two hours with about 70 ml helium released, as shown in Figure 34. 
 
Leak rate, [mbar l/s]
0 1e-5 2e-5 3e-5 4e-5
H
e 
co
nc
en
tr
at
io
n,
 [p
pm
]
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
y = 
1.4*
10
9 x
Mean values Linear approximationMeasurement values
 
 
60 
 
  0
0:
00
  0
4:
00
  0
8:
00
  1
2:
00
  1
6:
00
  2
0:
00
  0
0:
00
H
e 
co
nc
en
tr
at
io
n,
 [p
pm
]
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
O
ff-
ga
s 
flo
w
, [
m
3 /
h]
   
  P
ow
er
, [
%
]
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
He concentration Power Off-gas flow
2 h 14 min
ca 70 ml He
Day 2  
Figure 34. Increase of He concentration at F3. 
 
A few hours later, a slight increase in activity was detected (primarily Xe-138), as shown 
in Figure 35. It is however, not entirely clear if the activity increase was caused by a fuel 
failure or by some operational factors. It might be that the size of the failure was very small 
and the activity release was close to the detection limit.  
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Figure 35. He concentration and activity measurements at F3. 
 
Furthermore, 22 days after the first increase, there was another brief increase in the helium 
signal, with a duration of 20 minutes and the released amount of helium was estimated to 
about 10 ml, which is shown in Figure 36. At the same time an increase of gamma emitting 
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noble gases was detected, as can be seen in Figure 37. The measured increase of both the 
helium concentration and the concentrations of the active fission gases indicates a fuel failure. 
Most likely, these releases were from the same failure. At first most of the helium in a fuel 
rod leaked out due to the first penetration of the fuel cladding, and three weeks later, a small 
amount (approximately 10 ml) of the remaining helium was released. Afterwards, a gradual 
increase of Xe-133 activity was observed, which can also be seen in Figure 37. 
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Figure 36. Increase of He concentration at F3. 
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Figure 37. He concentration and activity measurements at F3. 
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Several months later, another increase of the helium concentration in the off-gases was 
detected, as shown in Figure 38. The duration of this increase was almost 2.5 hours and the 
helium amount determined during the increase was about 70 ml. Simultaneously, an increase 
of noble gas activity was measured, in particular of the long-lived isotopes Xe-133 and       
Xe-135, see Figure 39. This might be an indication that an additional failure occurred            
in the core. 
 
 
Figure 38. Increase of He concentration at F3. 
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Figure 39. He concentration and activity measurements at F3. 
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The experiences of our measurements at Forsmark have shown that the helium measuring 
system, installed in the off-gases in connection to the system for nuclide specific 
measurements of gamma emitting noble gases, is helpful when detecting fuel failures. 
However, neither system has been able to detect all the failed fuel, identified later by sipping 
during outage. One possible reason to why all the failed fuel rods have not been identified by 
the helium measurements could be periods of discontinuity of measured data. Furthermore, 
there were significant disturbance of the helium signal, e.g. due to the regeneration of 
adsorption columns and changes of the water levels in the Hotwell, which made it difficult to 
analyze the helium signal. Finally, each fuel failure is unique with different size and severity 
of the penetration and will therefore cause different release rates, which also needs to be 
studied further.  
The obtained results show that the on-line helium measuring system is able to detect 
helium released from fuel failures. Even though the detection needs to be optimized, it has 
already been shown to provide a valuable support to the nuclide specific measurements of 
gamma emitting noble gases, for detection of fuel failures. Yet, more experience of 
measurements is needed to be able to imrove the system and to verify the ability to detect fuel 
failures using helium measurements.  
8.2.3 Experiment	with	helium	injections	
An experiment at Forsmark 3 NPP was performed to ensure the ability of the helium 
measuring system, installed in the off-gas system, to detect helium that would correspond to a 
release from a fuel failure. The experiment and the obtained results are described in detail in 
Paper VI. In addition, the delay time and the spreading profile of the helium when the gas 
passes through different systems (reactor, turbine, condenser, ejector, recombiner, gas cooler, 
etc.) before reaching the detector were studied and presented in Paper IV. 
Helium injections into the feed water  
During the experiment, 80 ml and 40 ml of helium, i.e. amount of helium in an intact fuel rod 
or half of that amount, were injected followed by nitrogen of high pressure, which pressed 
helium into the feed water line leading to the reactor. Such rate of injection would correspond 
to an instantaneous release of all or half of the helium gas contained in a fuel rod.  
The injections with helium were made in a point, which is usually used for taking feed 
water grab samples, in close vicinity to the reactor core. The details regarding the feed water 
sampling line can be found in Paper VI.  
The pressure in the feed water pipe is at least the pressure in the reactor, e.g. 70 bar. In 
order to surpass the pressure in the feed water pipe and enable injection of the gas into the 
feed water, a dosing loop that would withstand high pressure was constructed using suitable 
Swagelok valves, as shown in Figure 40. A schematic set up of the experimental equipment 
and its connection to the injection point is shown in Figure 41. The volume of the loop (5) 
was determined to be 18 ml by weighing the empty loop and compare it to the weight of the 
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loop filled with deionized water. During the experiment, the loop (5) was filled with helium to 
a pressure of 4.5 bars which corresponds to 80 ml helium at standard pressure and room 
temperature considering the loop’s volume. Dosage of 80 ml helium was repeated twice, after 
that the helium amount was decreased by a factor of two, and two additional injections of 
helium were performed. The details of the experiment and the sequence of the execution can 
be seen in Paper VI. The exact time of the injections was registered in order to determine the 
delay time of the gas when being transported from the dosing point through the reactor, 
turbine, condenser, ejector, recombiner, gas cooler before it reached the point of measurement 
where the helium detector registered the increased signal. The frequency of sampling by the 
helium measuring system was switched to 10 seconds to achieve good resolution of the signal. 
Results of the experiment are shown in Figure 42, the summary of the results is presented in 
Table 1 in Paper VI. 
 
 
Figure 40. Dosing loop for helium injections into the feed water at F3. 
 
 
V1: three way valve for nitrogen (1) and helium 
(2) injections; 
V2: four way valve for switching the dosing loop 
for helium containment (5); 
V3: three way valve for the connection to the 
drain to the sewer (3) and to the dosing point (4); 
V4: three way valve for nitrogen injections to the 
gas container (6). 
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Figure 41. Schematic experimental set up for injection of helium into the feed water at F3. 
 
All four injections resulted in narrow and well defined peaks of the helium concentration 
in the off-gas system, with minimal spreading of the gas, as can be seen in Figure 42. As 
described earlier, each injection of helium was followed by a large amount of nitrogen of high 
pressure which led to a very rapid helium injection in the feed water. The delay time from the 
helium injections to the initial helium signal increases in the gas sampling point, was 
determined to be 5-8 minutes. The thorough analysis of the detector response and delay time 
estimation is described in Paper IV and Paper VI.  
All four peaks in the helium concentration signal have similar shape, as can be seen in 
Figure 42, showing only minor spreading of the gas when being transported from the dosing 
point to the sampling point. When the first increase of the helium concentration was detected, 
the signal increased rapidly and reached its maximum within 2-4 minutes. During the 
following 17-20 minutes, the signal decreased to less than 5% of its height. However, it took 
another 20 minutes for the signal to decrease to the original background level. 
The experiment at Forsmark 3 confirmed the ability to detect a primary fuel failure by a 
helium measuring system under the assumption that most of the helium contained in a fuel rod 
would be released within a reasonable short time period. However, the helium release rate 
from a fuel failure is unsure and further studies on this topic should be performed before any 
final conclusions are made. The experiment also showed that the described helium detection 
system is useful for estimation of the delay time for gases transported from the core to the gas 
sampling point in the off-gas system, as well as for studies of the gas spreading during the 
transport from the core to the sampling point. 
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Figure 42. Results of the experiment with helium injections into the feed water at F3. 
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Chapter	9	
 SUMMARY	
The main goal of this work was to investigate whether a system for on-line measurements of 
helium concentration, installed in the connection to an on-line nuclide specific gamma 
emitting noble gas measuring system, in the off-gases of a BWR would be useful for detection 
of fuel and control rod failures. To study the ability of such an on-line helium detector system, 
demo systems were installed in the off-gas systems at KKL in Switzerland and at Forsmark 3 
in Sweden. The outcome if this work is summarized in Papers I-VII. 
An on-line measuring system which combines monitoring of helium and nuclide specific 
gamma emitting noble gases in the off-as system is a robust and reliable method for detection 
of fuel and control rod failures, as presented in Papers I and II, since fuel rods contain both 
helium and gamma emitting noble gases, while control rods only contain helium. Such a 
system gives fast response and a prompt detection of both the helium gas and the noble gases 
that leak out into the coolant and are subsequently transported to a sampling point. 
The efficiency of the helium detector system for the surveillance of control rod integrity in 
the core has been confirmed by experiences from measurements at KKL, as described in 
Paper V, where the main purpose of the system has been the detection of control rod failures 
using continuous helium monitoring. Control rod failures at KKL have been identified and 
followed by the on-line helium detector system. Since 2012 the helium measurement system 
is part of the process control and is also part of the KKL core supervision system, which 
includes monitoring of thermal operation parameter of the reactor core and relevant chemical 
parameters of the reactor water. In addition, an equation determining the baseline of the 
helium in the core is developed, which would enable a prompt and automatic calculation of 
the released amounts of helium, once the equation is incorporated in the supervision system. 
At Forsmark, the main focus has been to evaluate the ability of the helium detector system 
to detect fuel failures. The experiences from the measurements performed during this project 
have shown good efficiency of the system and helium release from fuel failures have been 
detected, which is described in Paper VII. To verify the ability to detect even minor helium 
leaks, experiments with helium injections, described in Paper VI, were conducted at both 
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NPPs. These experiments assured the ability of the system to detect even small amounts of 
helium passing through the reactor core and the subsequent systems before reaching the 
sampling point in the off-gas system. In addition, as described in Paper VI, experiments at 
Forsmark 3 were performed to study the gas spreading when the helium were transported 
through the reactor systems, and to determine the delay time from the reactor core to the 
sampling point. This information is of great importance when performing a PST. 
However, when evaluating the measured results, a number of factors that can influence the 
measurements have to be taken into consideration. These factors are discussed in Paper III.  
Furthermore, although the helium measuring system is simple, user friendly, robust and 
cheap, it needs a periodic maintenance, with service of the detector recommended once per 
year. In addition to the periodic internal calibration, a calibration with sources of 
predetermined helium concentration should be performed at least once per year, to verify the 
conversion equation used to convert the detector leak signal mbar l/s to concentration in ppm. 
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Chapter	10	
 FUTURE	WORK	
To optimize the evaluation of the helium measurements and to simplify the analysis, the 
measured data should be automatically normalized and stored together with normalized values 
of the noble fission gases from the nuclide specific measurements of the off-gases. Data from 
the core supervision system, e.g. reactor power level, off-gas flow rate, control rod 
movements, hydrogen injection (if it is applied), etc. should also be stored, together with data 
on temperature and pressure in the sampling line. All these data should then be easily 
displayed using the same software in a combined system to make it easy to correlate changes 
in the concentration levels of helium and noble fission gases to each other and to reactor 
operational changes. The use of such a measuring system would be even more beneficial if 
the data could be stored automatically and be accessible from any computer at the NPP, as it 
is realized at KKL where the helium measurements are implemented into the core supervision 
system.   
An on-line helium measuring system could also be useful for location of leaking control 
rods in the core. The location of fuel failures during operation of a BWR can be identified by 
performing a PST. A PST is usually implemented as a support to the sipping procedure, which 
is performed during the outage. During a PST, measurements of the helium concentration in 
the off-gases could be performed in parallel with measurements of gamma emitting nuclides. 
This could show the location of leaking control rods at the same time as the location of failed 
fuel rods are found without any additional costs or inspections. 
The helium measuring system could also be used for tightness control of the condenser 
during start-up of the reactor. If the system would be permanently installed and automatically 
controlled, it would reduce both measurements uncertainties and extra costs.  
Another matter that needs to be improved is the accuracy of the control rod depletion 
estimation, used in a model the estimation of helium in a void volume of a control rod. When 
estimating the amount of helium in the void volume of a control rod, an average depletion of 
the whole control rod, which is often used today, might be misleading. As the helium release 
from the B4C in the control rod is dependent on the 10B depletion, segmented control rod 
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depletion or even node depletion should also be analyzed. When analyzing the helium release 
from Marathon control rods, knowledge of the 10B depletion, instead of the normally used 10B 
equivalent depletion, would give much more accurate results since 10B equivalent depletion 
includes depletion of hafnium which gives no contribution to the helium amount in a control 
rod. 
The model that was used to predict the amount of helium in a control rod depending on its 
depletion in this project could not be fully benchmarked as no reliable post-irradiation 
measurements of the helium inventory in a control rod were available to the authors. A high 
accuracy of the estimation of the helium amount in a control rod might anyway not be 
essential due to the uncertainties of the helium measurements, and since each failure is very 
individual and will therefore cause a different helium release profile. 
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